Kashering Kaylim for Pesach and All Year Round Part I

Dear Halachaboy: Can I kasher my barbecue for pesach use?

 

Of course before one can kasher something, all surface dirt and grime must be removed. Once you are left with a clean utensil we are still worried flavor was infused into the utensil and it is this flavor we are discussing.

 

The Mishna, Avodah Zarah 75b, states an important principle regarding kashering: if one wants to kasher utensils that were used for non-kosher food, the method of kashering depends on the normal use of that utensil.  A utensil whose contact with non-kosher food is normally through a liquid medium (cooking) is kashered by hagalah (placing the utensil in boiling water). A utensil whose exposure to heat is normally without a liquid medium is kashered through libun (direct fire). (Whether the item could withstand the heat is a different story- and you need to ask your local chemist).The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 76b, describes this principle as k'bol'o kach polto, the manner in which the non-kosher food enters the utensil is the same manner in which it is expelled. The Gemara, Pesachim 30b, uses the term k'bol'o kach polto to describe the methods of kashering utensils for Pesach that were previously used for chametz.

Nevertheless, the Gemara, Avodah Zarah 76a, provides a leniency regarding kashering that may be applicable to Pesach. The Gemara states that if the item that was absorbed into the utensil was permissible at the time of its absorption and later became prohibited while already absorbed in the utensil, one may kasher the utensil through hagalah (boiling water) even if the manner of absorption was through a non-liquid medium. This principle is known as heteirah balah (it was absorbed as a permissible item).

There is a dispute among the Rishonim regarding the applicability of the heteirah balah principle to Pesach. Tosafot, Pesachim 30b, note that the absorption of chametz prior to Pesach might be considered a form of heteirah balah, (since at the time of absorption chametz is not prohibited) and therefore, utensils can be kashered through boiling water even if they absorbed chametz directly. However, many Rishonim disagree with the premise that chametz is considered heteirah balah. Ramban explains that vis-א-vis Pesach, chametz is never considered a permissible item. Although, it is permissible to eat chametz throughout the year, the chametz status always exists. The principle of heteirah balah only applies to an item that undergoes a status change from being completely permissible to becoming prohibited while it is absorbed in the utensil. [The Gemara's example of heteirah balah is the meat of a korban that is absorbed into a utensil and while it is in the utensil becomes notar (leftover meat), which is prohibited.] Bread even during the year is called Chametz,however a Karbon isn't called Nosar until after the permited time has passed. Therefore, there are no grounds to perform hagalah on a utensil that absorbed chametz through a non-liquid medium.

Shulchan Aruch codifies the opinion of Ramban that one must use direct fire to remove chametz that was absorbed through a non-liquid medium. Nevertheless, Mishna Berurah notes that the opinion that chametz is considered heteirah balah should not be discounted completely and may be used in situations where there are other reasons to permit hagalah.

 

As always ask a Rav and your local Fireman for assistance when trying to apply these halachos.

(Quoted from Rav Flug of YuTorah.org)

Meat and Fish Part III

There is one more issue we need to discuss and that is the issue of milsa avidah l'ta'amah. The gemara says that anything that is Milsa avidah l'ta'amah- literally things that are put into food for there taste-are not batul. Meaning, if a certain ingredient was placed into food for taste, even if there is 60 times that ingredient it is not automatically batul.

 

In our case of Worcestershire sauce it stands to reason that they only but anchovies into the sauce because anchovies add the desired flavor and thus even though some Worcestershire sauces have less than 1/60th anchovies shouldn't a "F"  still be required on the kashrus symbol?

 

Rav Eitan Schnall qouting Rav Schechter explains that the rule of Milsa avidah l'ta'amah only eliminates the heter of 1/60th if you can taste it, but if a chef says that he can't taste it then it could still be batul. This logic makes a lot of sense, the concept of bitul is not hokus-pokus, it works within reality, thus if the taste still exists, even if less than 1/60th we can't go and say it doesn't. However, if something was put in for taste and we can verify that it can't be tasted the concept of bitul would apply again,

 

According to Rav Dovid Cohen, of the Chicago Rabbinical Council, in reality there is only  the smallest amount of fish molecules in Worcestershire sauce that for sure you don't taste it. However, the companies put the anchovies into the sauce because any self respecting chef only uses Worcestershire sauce with anchovies. So the flavor comes from some artificial flavoring and they put in enough to get it on the ingredient list, but since there is no taste of anchovies and the anchovies are less than 1/60th, one is allowed to use with meat.

Fish and Meat Part II

In general if an ounce of non kosher food becomes absorbed in sixty ounces of kosher food we assume that the entire mixture is kosher. We require sixty times the forbidden food to nullify it because the taste of the forbidden food is not discernible when mixed with sixty times its volume. Although forbidden foods may become nullified in sixty times their volume, one may not initially nullify a forbidden food by adding more permitted food. This principle is known as "ein mivatlin issur lechatchila".
 
Can we apply this rule to foods which are prohibited for sakana, danger, also?
 
a. The Taz writes that dangerous foods cannot become nullified in sixty times their volume. The logic for this view is that nullification only works to neutralize taste but does nothing to mitigate potential danger in food. Furthermore, Chazal teach us that chamira sakanta m'issura (we must treat dangerous foods with more caution than we treat halachically prohibited foods).
 
b. The Shach disagrees with the Taz. The Shach argues that chamira sakanta m'issura is a principle that is limited to a case of doubt, but would not extend to the laws of bittul. Pitchei Teshuvah points out that according to the Chatam Sofer fish and meat may have lost its status as a dangerous food (because modern medicine does not recognize any problem with it) and may now have the status of forbidden food (because the rabbis decreed not to mix the two). As such the rules governing fish and meat should certainly be the same as the rules governing other prohibited foods, and should therefore become nullified in sixty times their volume. 
 
One very common practical application of the above dispute is the issue of Worcestershire Sauce, which is a steak sauce with fish ingredients. Lea & Perrin's Worcestershire Sauce, which is certified by the OU, has the following ingredient list:
INGREDIENTS:  Prepared From All Natural Ingredients: Water, Vinegar, Molasses, High Fructose Corn Syrup, Anchovies, Hydrogarlic, Clove, Chili Peppers, Natural Flavorings And Shallots.
 
Rav Eitan Schnall (born and raised in West Hempstead) in a shiur on this issue qouted Rav Schechter, who guides the policies of the OU, ruled that the OU should label any sauce that contains more than 1.67% (1/60th) fish with an OU Fish to indicate that it should not be eaten with meat. If, however, the sauce is composed of less than 1.67% fish no labeling is required. Rav Schechter ruled leniently in this issue due to a safek sefika. First, perhaps the Magen Avraham (who we mentioned last week) who says the whole issue of fish and meat doesn't apply anymore is correct, and even if the prohibition still applies perhaps the Shach is right that foods prohibited on account of danger may be nullified.In regards to Lea& Perrin's sauce, there is more than 1/67% anchovie and thus bears an OU- F.

Editors' note: Star-K agrees with the OU ruling on this issue. However, the OK has a policy of putting OK-F even if less than 1/60th, for those that want to be machmir, and this can be seen on Tropicana with Omega-3.

Fish and Meat

Dear Halachaboy,
 
Q : I know there is a prohibition of eating fish and meat. What exactly are the parameters of this prohibition and how far does it extend? For example, can I broil a salmon and steak in the same oven if both are uncovered but not touching?
 
A: I love getting questions, they keep me going through these dark days of winter (please keep the coming at thehalachaboy@gmail.com ).
 
We all know that Torah frowns on things that are hazardous to you health (Vnishmartim Moad L'Nofshosechem- Hashem exhorts us to be exceedingly careful with our souls and bodies). This prohibition extends to anything that is potentially hazardous. I have heard Rav Willig, from YU, say that one who skis or plays hockey might be violating this prohibition. Further, everyone agrees that smoking cigarettes is a clear violation of this prohibition.
 
The Gemara in Pesachim says that while the Torah does not forbid eating fish and meat together, it is still forbidden because it will lead to Tzaaras and other ailments. Further the Shulchan Aruch rules that while now-a-days one may drink from a glass that was left uncovered overnight (even though it was forbidden in the times of the Gemara for perhaps snakes injected venom into the drink), one is still forbidden to eat fish and meat.
 
We can understand this Shulchan Aruch by assuming that whenever the Gemara made a health decree, the decree is valid only as long as the hazard exists. So while we don't have snakes anymore, there are still many food related ailments that we need to worry about.  To be intellectually honest there are those that allow eating fish and meat, even together, but the general consensus is not like them and we try to avoid it.
 
Do we extend the prohibition even to cooking them together?
The issue here is that the foods are never coming into contact; it is just their reich (smell/ aroma/ steam) that might be imparted into one another.
There are three main opinions to this:
 
1. Opinion of Rav Moshe Isserlis. The Rema (Yoreh Deah 116:2) writes that lechatchila one must be careful not to roast meat and fish together in the same oven. However, ex post facto, one who cooked fish and meat together in a single oven may eat the fish and the meat. Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 116:10 strongly
supports the view of the Rema stating that in spite of all of the dissenting opinions we need only concern ourselves with the words of the Rema.
 
2. Opinion of Maharshal. The Shach (ibid. 1) cites the opinion of the Maharshal  that one may even cook meat and fish lechatchila simultaneously in the same oven. He opines that even those who believe that reicha is significant would agree that this is only true regarding forbidden foods and is not true regarding dangerous foods.
 
3. Opinion of Be'er Sheva. The Shach (ibid.) cites the opinion of the Be'er Sheva that although we would generally permit reicha ex post facto, since we are stricter with danger than with forbidden foods (chamira sakanta m'issura) we would not even allow one to eat meat that has already been cooked with fish in.
 
As always ask you Rav if this situation arises, but remember you are playing with real danger, not just G-d's hibby jibbies!
 
If anyone can explain to me why we are stricter with dangerous foods than with forbidden foods (chamira sakanta m'issura) I would love to hear. I mean, logically, I would think eating something naturally dangerous is less bad in G-d's eyes than eating something he declared forbidden.
 
(taken from a shiur from Rav Aryeh Leibowitz, a Rav in North Woodmere)
 
HALACHABOY JOKE:
Teacher: Yisroel Pinchas, use the word 'officiate' in a sentence.
Yisroel Pinchas: A man got sick from officiate.!!!
 
Next we will hopefully discuss Worcestershire Sauce (which apparently is a steak sauce made with fish).

Waiting to put on a Talis until one is Married

Last week we began our discussion on Minhagei Yekkie. As we mentioned last week, the two most common minhangim are wearing a talis from bar mitzva (and not waiting till your wedding) and washing your hands before kiddush. If you missed out on last weeks shiur you can always catch up here http://thehalachaboy.blogspot.com/ . This week let us discuss the other minhag.

 

If one were to sit down and think about it for a moment, the Yekkie's seem to be correct. When a child turns the age of majority (boy 13 and girl 12) we all know that they are now required to perform all positive mitzvos and avoid all averios. So what right do we have to push of wearing a talis till marriage?

 

First off let us realize that wearing a tallis, or tzitzis for that matter, is only a requirement if you are already wearing a four cornered garment. ( I wish I knew this back in high school). However, since we like to recieve presents and rewards, we put on four cornered garments with tzitzis. In fact in many yeshivos they put up signs alerting the -people where and when you can perform various mitzvos (scheita- ritual slaughter, shiluach ha'ken- shewing away a mother bird before taking her eggs, etc). So by not wearing a talis we aren't doing an avera; we just are passing up infinite reward.

 

But why do we want to pass up easy presents?

 

There are at least four explanations for our custom not to wear a talis until married and they are listed, in order of plausibility, below:

1. The Maharil (14th century) in his sefer on Minhagim quotes the custom not to wear a talis until married and he bases it of the connection of the pasukim between getting married and wearing tzittis (see Parshas Ki Seitzei 22: 13-14). We know everything in the torah is written in a specific order to teach us something, so when Hashem decided to put the requirement/ option (its an arguement for another time) to get married next to the mitzva of tzitzis, it was to teach us that one should only wear a tallis once he is married.

2. The Mishna Brurah in the Bear Haitiv quotes a source based on the Gemara in Kiddushin 29b: which says that Rav Huna refused to talk to Rav Hamenuna because Rav Hamenuna was not married and wasn't Pores Sudar (literally: wrapped with a cloth/tallis). While Rashi learns this gemara to mean that Rav Hamenuna did wear a talllis he just didn't cover his head with it, apparently according to the Bear Haitiv others learn that Rav Hamenuna didn't wrap himself with a tallis at all because he wasn't married.

3. The Knesses Hagadol writes that perhaps people were so poor in Eastern Europe that they couldn't afford a tallis for the children when they became Bar Mitzvas, and there was a takana (jewish decree) that in order not to financially stress anyone, all children would not wear tallism until they got married.

4. Finally, the Knesess Hagadol writes that perhaps it used to be that children would get married at 13, and thus people began to associate wearing a tallis as a requirement once married and not due to Bar Mitzva. Thus, once the marriageable age increased people continued to follow this wrong belief and it became a minhag.

 

Either way, the minhag has been established that most Ashkenazic men do not wear a tallis until they are married, and thus even though the textual support is a bit lacking, Minhag Yisroel Torah- Minhag's even if wrong should be followed and become Halacha. Much like the gemara in Bava Metzia (59b- and one of the best stories in Shas) about Rav Eliezer and the Tanor Shel Achnei. Rav Eleizer and the Rabbis argued about the halachic status of a certain type of oven. And while the heaven's decreed that Rav Eliezer was right, since the rule if we follow the majority, they decided to follow to the Rabbis. (for a further discussion on this story and its implications I found this interesting site http://sagoboulevard.blogsome.com/2005/11/10/lo-bashamayim-hi/ ) So too by tallis, even though it seems one should wear a tallis once he becomes a Bar Mitzva, the minhag, for good or for bad, is against that and that is what we must follow.

Making Kiddush on Bread/ Washing Before Kiddush

The Gemara in Pesachim (106a-b) says that Rav Bruna said that one who washed his hands (Netillas Yedayim) can no longer say Kiddush on Friday Night. The gemara, however, argues with this statement by quoting a story of how Rav would sometimes make Kiddush using wine and other times he would use bread. What is the reason for Rav Bruna's ruling and how exactly does Rav's ruling conflict with that of Rav Bruna? 
 
1. The Rashbam says that Rav Bruna was telling us once you washed your hands for bread, saying Kiddush is considered a hefsek (interruption) between the washing and the bread. Thus, you should listen to someone else's Kiddush and once finished you can go make Hamotzi. Rav argued on this however, and said you don't have to hear someone else's Kiddush rather just make Kiddush on bread. However, even Rav would agree that saying Kiddush on wine would be a hefsek between washing and Hamotzi. 
 
2. The Rif and Rambam, as quoted by the Ran, say that once you wash Netilas Yedayim you are showing that you want to eat bread more than drink wine, thus once you wash you can not make Kiddush on wine, because you don't wine, and Rav Bruna held you can't make Kiddush on bread so therefore you were out of options. However, comes Rav and argues and says you are allowed to make Kiddush on bread and thus if you washed already (and shown you want to eat bread) make Kiddush on bread.

 

The Rambam paskins that one can make Kiddush on bread, lchatchila if he desires it more or if there is no wine, and B'di'eved if he washed by accident.
 

3. Ba'al Hamaor says that not only is it forbidden to make Kiddush once you eat, but even once you wash you hands you can not make Kiddush, because once you wash your hands you are showing you would rather eat, so the Rabbi's punished you and forbade you from making Kiddush. However, comes Rav and says if you washed, while you lost out on making Kiddush with wine, you can still make it on bread.
 
4. Rabbenu Tam says that once you wash you can't make Kiddush because Rav Bruna holds that you can make Kiddush outside (Yais Kiddush Shelo B'makom Seuda) and thus there will be a lot of time between washing and Hamotzi, and perhaps your Netillas Yedayim is a Beracha L'evatala. However, Rav holds Ein Kiddush Ela B'makom Seuda and thus you'll be near the table, so a lot of time won't pass between washing and Hamotzi. According to Rabbenu Tam when Rav says he made Kiddush on bread, that does not mean you can make Kiddush on bread (for Rabbenu Tam holds that isn't allowed), rather Rav meant since he was close to his table he made kiddush on wine and then immediatly ate some bread.
 
5. Fifth Pshat- If you wash and then make Kiddush with wine, looks like you washed on wine and Ga'aveh to wash before fruits.(don't have source)

6. Sixth Pshat-  Like Rabbenu Tam except issue isn;t a time issue, its a hefsek issue. Rav Bruna held Yeish Kiddush Shelo Bmakom, therefor since Kiddush isn't required to be said at the table, it is a hefsek to the washing/Motzi. However, Rav who requires Kiddush B'makom will reason that Kiddush is as much part of a meal as anything else and thus not a hefsek to washing/Motzi.(again, don't have source).

7. Shut HaRashba- Rav Bruna was saying if you wash your hands first it shows a zilzul (disregard) for Kiddush. However, once Rav teaches us that you can make Kiddush with bread the fact that I am washing before Kiddush isn't a disregard anymore, for perhaps I am washing because I am going to make Kiddush on bread. Further, once it's not a zilzul better to wash your hands first because wacky to come to table then leave to wash then come back to table. It is better to first wash and then come to the table for meal, then to leave table right after you just arrived. 
 
This idea of the Rashba is quoted by the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch as the minhag for all Ashkenazim. But as we mentioned earlier only Yekkies do this. Why don't the rest of us?
 
The Mishna Brurah writes that following the Rashba is a risk, because if he is wrong all the other rishonim will say you made Beracha L'evitallas because once you wash you can't make Kiddush on wine. So it is better to play it safe, because even the Rashba says it is allowed to wash after Kiddush, then risk the Rashba being wrong.
 
But then why do the Yekki's follow the Rashba?
 
Either because, as we mentioned above, it looks weird to leave table once you arrive, or perhaps, as the Taz writes, since if you were making Kiddush on bread you would wash before Kiddush, so the Rabbis made a uniform rule (Lo plug) that you always wash before Kiddush, even if on wine. 
 
 
 
 

An Additional Haskafic Touch

Interesting side point: As mentioned earlier (see Zimun: What must I eat?) the K'lal of Yatza Motzei only applies to Birchas HaMitzvos and not to Birchos HaNenen. This is interesting because the source of for Yatza Motzei is the concept of Kol Yisrael Arevim Ze L'ze. Why should the concept of Avros, a communal bound, only apply to Ruchniyus (Birchas Hamitvos)and not to Gashmiyus (Birchas HaNenen) ?

 

We can answer with the following yesod. My being yotzei you with a beracha can only work if we both have the same kavana. Further, connecting to someone else's kavanah is only possible work in ruchniyos. In regards to ruchniyos we all deep down want the same thing (Shalom,Geula, Torah, Avodah, Chesed, Mashiach). We all do mitzvos to bring us closer to Hashem and Hashem closer to us. However, in terms of gashmiyos we are all in different boats. I cannot understand why you have the things you do, and you can't possible understand why I have what I do. Since, my being yotzei you with a beracha works only if you have the same kavana as mine, it could only possible work in ruchniyos. 

 

In terms of Birchas HaNenen I can be yotzei you if in fact I need the same beracha myself (Challah on friday night).  This is the Klal of Shomai K'ohneh. Based on the above, we can say the reason this works is that when our gashmiyus levels are exactly the same, we in fact have the same kavanos. We both want the apple because it looks and tastes yummy. 

 

However, since in this world no two people are exactly the same the the pride and haughtiness that comes when having something someone else doesn't have or the unfortunate feeling of deficiency and lacking that results when seeing something you desire but don't have is really unwarranted. One can only possible think he is special or lacking, if the other person was in the exact same position as you; in your own boat.

Let us appreciate our own boats when it comes to materialism; and let us enjoy the shared comfort on our boat of yiddishkeit.

Zimun: What must I eat?

Continuing our discussion of Zimun, the gemara in Berachos (48a) discusses how many people at a meal actually need to eat bread in order to have a zimun. The gemara says that when it comes to a zimun of 10 ( to say Elokeynu in the zimun) you need at least 7 people to eat bread, and the remaining three can eat salad. This is due to the concept of Ruba D'Nikar ( a substantial majority). The gemara, unfortunatly, never discusses the same question in regards to a zimun of 3. What if 2 people had bread and the third ate a salad, can you have a zimun?

 

This question a big debate between Tosfos and the Ran. Tosfos rules that just as 7 out of 10 is a substantial majority (70%), so to is 2 out of 3 (67%), and therefor as long as two out of the three had bread a zimun should be said. The Ran, however, argues and says that while mathematically there should be no difference, the Gemara in other places seems to be more strigent in the case of a zimun of three. Thus, one can not assume that just because Ruba D'Minkar works by a zimun of 10, so too it should apply by a zimun of three. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch actually bring down both opinions. The Mishna Brurah offers a solution, and says ideally we should try to make the third person eat bread, however, if he refuses to than we can rely on Tosfos and say a zimun.

 

What must the third person eat (or people 7-10)? The Yershulami says the person must eat a mezonos-type product to count. The Bavli, however,a says that the person not eating bread can eat vegetables instead and still count towards to the zimun. Most Rishonim assume that if veggies are allowed, so too is any drink that is not water-based (wine, juice, etc.). However, water-based drinks (soda, ice tea, etc.), while being essential to health, don't fill you up and thus one who drinks only water can't be included in a zimun. The Magen Avraham, argues on this and says since when is the requirement for zimun that the item must fill you up, rather any food or drink that you derive benefit from (water included) can be used to count you towards a zimun. Again the Mishna Brurach says that ideally we should try to make the third person eat bread, however, if he refuses to

than as long as he drank something non-water based (against the Magen Avraham) we can count him towards the zimun.

 

Finally, may the one who is not eating bread lead the zimun? Since there is a K'lal of Yatza Motzei (I can make a beracha for you, even if i don't need it myself, like the megillah reader who rereads for the latecomers) that applies to all Mitzvos (unfortunatly, it doesn't apply to berachos on eating) one would think that since Benching is a mitzva anyone can lead the zimun. Remember, orginally the one who led the zimun said the whole Benching out loud and everyone else listened and was yotzei (like kiddush on friday night). However, the Rabbanun made a decree, that unless one ate a Kezayis he could not lead the Benching. Since in the zimun it says Sh'achalnu (that we ate), it would be decieving to have someone who didn't eat any bread say the Benching for those that had bread. If one did in fact eat a kizayis of bread but wasn't full, the Shulchan Aruch still rules he shouldn't lead the Benching if someone else at the meal at bread and is full. This is due to the pasuk from where Benching is learnt out "Vachlta V'Savata U'veRachta" meaning you should eat, be satisfied and bless. Thus, the Mitza Deoraysa of Benching is only if one is full, and better to have the leader of the Benching be someone who is involved in a Mitzva Deoraysa than D'rabanan.

 

 

Women and Zimun

There is a misconception that if three or more women eat a bread meal together there is no requirement of zimun. Further, many feel that those women that do zimun are a product of the 20th century feminist movement and have no basis in halacha.

 

The truth is that the Gemara in Brachos (45b) says that women may perform a zimun by themselves. The Rosh, in fact, rules that this gemara implies a requirement on women benching to also have a zimun. Tosfos and the Shulchan Aruch, however, learn that this is not a requirement  of women but merely an option. There is no one that says it is forbidden for women to have a zimun (obviously, as this would go against the gemara).

 

The Shulchan Aruch does rule that if there is already a zimun of men, women should join them and answer along. However, if there is only one or two men and three or more women, and the women decide to do a zimun, what should the men do?

 

Rav Shlomo Zalman (as quoted by his nephew in Halichos Beisah) rules that men should answer like they normally do.

 

Rav Dovid Feinstein Shlita, as quoted by Rav Dov Frimmer, rules that men can answer as outsiders and say "Barukh u-mevorach shmo tamid le-olam va'ed",which is what one answers to a zimmun if he didn't eat bread or cake (another Halacha very few people know, and we might discuss next week)

 

The concept that men should walk out and not answer at all, is attributed to a sefer Ha'Isha V'Hamitzvos and is unsupported.

 

So why don't the majority of women bench with a zimun now-a-days? Shouldn't they want to do it, even if merely optional?

 

Rav Moshe Feinstein, in discussing whether men have to wait for women when starting zimun, posits that since women are busy taking care of the the house and the children, they never really establish themselves as a permanent fixture in the meal. Thus, men should, however need not, wait for women for zimun. So too we can say that since women's eating is rushed, there is no requirement of zimun, for the requirement of zimun only sets in when having a permanence.

 

Rav Dovid Feinstein is of the opinion, (so I've heard) that since women used to not know the halachos of zimun nor could they read Hebrew, they never did it. And thus, it has become a minhag that women don't do zimun now-a-days, even though they can read Hebrew and be taught the halachos of zimun.

 

(Compiled with help from chaburas.org, Rav A. Zivotofsky, and Mail-Jewish)

 

Why no Al Hanissim in Al Hamichya?

On all jewish festivals there is a special insert we add into our bentching (ritzei, ya'aleh v'yavo and al hanissim). Usually, there is also a parallel insert into the al hamichya's we make. However, on Chanukah and Purim we only mention the holiday in benching and not in al ha'michya.

 

Why is that?

 

The following two answers are from Rav Flug, from YUTorah.org

R. Chaim Soloveitchik (cited in Haggadah Shel Pesach MiBeit Levi page 233) suggests that the reason why Chanukah and Purim are not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh is based on the concept of the compensatory beracha for Birkat HaMazon. The Gemara, Berachot 49a-b, provides a solution for one who omits R'tzei or Ya'aleh V'Yavo from the Birkat HaMazon of Shabbat and Yom Tov.  If one realizes the mistake after completing the beracha of Uv'nei Yerushalayim, but prior to reciting HaTov V'HaMeitiv, one can recite a compensatory beracha at that point and there is no need to return to the beginning of Birkat HaMazon. This beracha is only available for the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh.

R. Chaim explains that the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh (aka Al Hamichya) is an abridged form of all of the berachot of Birkat HaMazon. Anything that is not a beracha is not included in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. Although the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh don't normally appear as independent berachot, they have the potential to exist as independent berachot in the form of the compensatory beracha. Therefore, the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh are abridged and included in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. The additions for Chanukah and Purim (i.e. Al HaNissim) do not have a compensatory beracha and do not exist as independent berachot. Therefore, they are not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. [Based on this logic, R. Chaim explains why the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh appear after Uv'nei Yerushalayim and not before. Although in the normal Birkat HaMazon, these additions appear before Uv'nei Yerushalayim, the compensatory beracha is recited after Uv'nei Yerushalayim. Therefore, one should view the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh as an abridged form of Birkat HaMazon when the compensatory beracha is recited and the logical placement for these additions is after Uv'nei Yerushalayim.]

R. Yosef D. Soloveitchik (cited in Harerei Kedem Vol. I, page 302 and Iggros HaGrid (Berachos 3:13)), presents a slightly different answer than that of his grandfather, R. Chaim. He suggests that the additions of Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh have a different status than the additions of Chanukah and Purim. On Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh, the function of the additions is to mention the day. The inherent kedushas hayom of the day is mechayev hazkarah. On Chanukah and Purim, which have no kedushas hayom (all types of melacha are allowed), the function of Al HaNissim is to provide a detailed account of G-d's providence in the Hoda'ah section of the Amidah and Birkat HaMazon. Therefore, the additions of Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh are independent portions of Birkat HaMazon. Al HaNissim is not an independent portion of Birkat HaMazon, rather an extension of the Hoda'ah section. It is merely an expansion of the bracha of hodaah. Thus, Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh, whose purpose is to provide an abridged version of Birkat HaMazon, abridges all portions of Birkat HaMazon by providing the main idea of each portion. The additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov, and Rosh Chodesh are independent portions of Birkat HaMazon and are therefore abridged and included in Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. However, Al HaNissim is not an independent portion and it is not the main idea of the Hoda'ah section. Therefore, it is not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh.
 

Pas Haba B'Kisnin at Dessert

Last week we mentioned that the bracha of Hamotzi only exempts food that are for the sake of the meal (ie foods used to satiate), however, snack foods require their own bracha. Thus, it would seem that any mezonos dessert (assuming you are eating it not to fill you up) would require a beracha.
 
However,Rav Akiva Eiger says this really all depends. As we have mentioned previously there is a three way debate as to what exactly is Pas Haba B'kisnin. Not to get into the details but Pas Haba B'kisnin is considered a snack food and would require a Mezonos unless you are eating it for a meal, in which case you would wash make Hamotzi and Bench. The three opinions of what Pas Haba B'kisnin are:
1. Rashba- dough with a pocket filled with sweets (honey, jam, fruit)- like a Hamintoshin or fruit pie.
2. Rambam- dough enhanced with ingredients other than flour and water- like chocolate cake or zomick's challah.
3. Rav Hai Gaon- dough cooked to a point where it is dry, brittle and crunchy- like breadsticks or crackers.
 
While we normally assume that all three of these opinions are correct and we make a Mezonos on them, unless eating them as a meal, in the case of eating them for dessert we rule differently. Since, we have a concept of Safek Berachos L'hakel -- since berachos only d'rabanan when in doubt we don't say them-- unless we are sure this dessert item is a snack food we don't make a beracha on it.
 
Thus, while according to the Rambam cake is Pas Haba B'kisnin and considered a snack food, the Rashba himself would hold that cake is pure "bread" and thus would be exempt from a beracha due to the Hamotzi said earlier in the meal. So unless the dessert item fulfills all three criteria mentioned above, we err on the side of caution and don't make a beracha. Of course, there are many desserts that do contain all three criteria (chocolate wafers)
 
The Mishna Brurah argues and says that since we assume all three opinions are right, we are in fact assuming that any food covered in one of those opinions is for sure a Mezonos and would require a separate beracha.  

 

There are those as a way of avoiding this question who will bench prior to having dessert.
 

Fruits Eaten During a Bread Meal

I would like to demystify and clarify a very confusion halacha that comes about almost daily, and that is the issue of eating fruit during a meal.

The Gemara in Berachos (41b) writes that any food eaten in the course of a bread meal does not require a bracha, provided the food is for the meal. However, food eaten during a bread meal, that is not eaten for the meal, does require its own beracha, even though you already made a Hamotzi on the bread.

The issue that is raised and highly debated is how do we define if a certain food item is "for the meal" or "not for the meal." Rashi learns "for the meal" as any food eaten with bread. Thus, one would be required to make a separate bracha on every food item at the table not eaten with the bread (chulent, kugel, salad, etc.)

Tosfos, as explained by Rabbenu Yona, argues and defines "for the meal" as meal type foods. Meaning, any food normally eaten in the context of a meal is exempt from a beracha if one already made a Hamotzi on bread. However, food which is not normally eaten as a meal type food ("snack foods") would require a beracha if eaten in a bread meal, even though you already made a Hamotzi on the bread.

While this Tosfos explains why we don't make separate berachas on chulent, salad, and kugel, the big issue that is discussed is what about fruit. Fruit, generally, is characterised as a "snack type food" and thus might require a beracha even if eaten during a bread meal.

In order to clarify when fruit does and does not require a bracha we can analyze the following three cases:
1. Fruit eaten as the main course- When eating fruit as the main course, you effectively turn the fruit from a snack-type food, to a meal-type food and no beracha is required (provided you already said Homotzi).
2. Fruit eaten as one of the courses- Since you are eating other courses, the fruit can not be called the meal-food and thus retains its status as snack-type and would require a beracha, even if you already said Hamotzi.
3. Fruit eaten to whet your appetite- Apparently Chazal felt that certain fruits (grapefruit is the big discussion) increase your appetite for other food items (I would love to know if this is proven scientifically), and thus are considered secondary to the meal and thus no berachas are required.

To conclude, it would seem that most of the time fruit is served in a meal, it is served in a case 2 scenario, where it is just one of the courses, and thus would require its own beracha. Fruit served for dessert for sure requires its own beracha, as it is definitely a snack food.

So an apple a day, not only keeps the doctor away, it provided another opportunity to thank Hashem for His kindness.

(Next week i'yh we will discuss if a beracha is required on Mezonos desserts)

V'sen Tal: Why December 4th?

Though both the mention of rain and request for rain are inserted in the winter, there is a difference between them. Mention of rain (mashiv haruach) is inserted during the rainy season, and the request for rain (v’sen tal u’matar l’bracha) is made at that time when we desire rainfall. We begin mentioning rain (mashiv haruach) on Shmini Atzeres. Though it would make sense to mention rain during the Succot festival (as that is the beginning of the raining season), we nonetheless refrain from doing so. This is because rain is considered a bad omen during the festival since it makes it impossible to fulfill the commandment of sitting in the succah. Therefore, the sages ruled that our praise for rain begin after the Succot festival (Shemini Atzeres). What is more, they decided that this would take place during the Mussaf prayer when all are present and it is possible to make an announcement reminding everybody to begin mentioning rain. The evening prayer was not chosen because not everybody attends it; the morning prayer was likewise ruled out because it is impossible to make an announcement before it, for it is forbidden to interrupt between the Shema (geulah) and the Amida (tefilla) (Beit Yosef, Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 112:1, 2). However, the sages delayed the request for rain fifteen days (v’sen tal), to the night of the seventh of Cheshvan. They did this in order that the last of the festival pilgrims be able reach home before the rains fall (Gemara Ta’anis 10a). This custom continues even after the destruction of the Holy Temple because any custom which recalls the great days when the Holy Temple stood is very dear to us, and we do not wish to discontinue it. Only after the Temple is rebuilt (speedily in our days!) will the Sanhedrin be able to change the time for requesting rain taking into account modern means of transportation. In Babylon, the sages ruled that the request for rain should be delayed for sixty days after the Autumnal Equinox. This was because they had plenty of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and therefore did not need to make numerous requests for rain with the onset of the rainy season. According to the Shulchan Aruch all other lands outside of Israel (America) follow the practice of Babylon and begin requesting rain on the sixtieth day after the Autumnal Equinox However, we must ask the obvious question, the autumnal equinox is September 22nd, sixty days later is November 22nd, so how did we arrive at the custom to begin the recitation of v’sen tal on December 4th? The answer to this question requires a historical background. In the year 46 BCE, Julius Caesar established what became known as the Julian Calendar. This calendar had 12 months, and one year had 365.25 days. Every four years, the quarter-days appeared on the calendar as a leap year day. However, the actual length of a solar year is slightly less than this, approximately 365.24219 days. In the short run, this difference is negligible, but over time it adds up ( you end up a day behind approximately every 150 years). This eventually caused a problem with regard to the seasons, which depended on the solar year and were gradually failing to fall out at the proper time. To fix this situation, Pope Gregory XIII, in 1582, instituted the Gregorian calendar. Two changes were made with the change in calendar. The first is that 10 days were "lost," meaning that October 4th that year was followed by October 15th (which makes sense as approximately 1500 years had passed, they were 10 days behind). With regard to our issue, v'sein tal u'matar that year was said on December 1st instead of November 22nd. The second change that was made was more subtle, but is perhaps more important. The rule for leap years was altered slightly, with every century year NOT divisible by 400 losing its leap-year status. Thus, 1600 was a leap year, but 1700, 1800, and 1900 were not. This had the effect of changing the average length of a year to 365.2425 days, a difference that is much less noticeable over time (a margin of error of roughly 3 days in 10,000 years). As a result, the date for v'tein tal u'matar was bumped up one day in each of those three years (1700, 1800 and 1900) ( We didn’t bump up in 2000 because that is divisible by 4 and thus was a leap year), bringing us to our current date of December 4th (thus, after 2100, the date will become December 5th). The only exception to be aware of is that v'tein tal u'matar is added beginning from December 5th in the Diaspora when the following Gregorian year is a leap year. This is due to the fact that the Jewish year begins several months earlier and factors in the extra day from the beginning (This relates to the fact that the Jewish calendar is based on both the solar and the lunar ones). In southern hemisphere countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Australia, where the rainy season coincides with Israel’s summer, Torah authorities rule that the request for rain be made in the "Birkat Hashanim" blessing according to the custom of the Land of Israel. This is because the Land of Israel is the focal point of creation and all other lands are subordinate to her. However, if in these southern hemisphere countries there are places where rain causes damage in the summer, it is impossible for the people there to request rain in "Birkat Hashanim." They should therefore recite the summer version all year round, and request rain in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. The reason that they are not able to request rain in "Birkat Hashanim" during their rainy season is that they must follow the practice of the Land of Israel. And they cannot request rain in "Birkat Hashanim" during Israel’s rainy season because rain is deleterious for them at this time. Therefore, they request rain for themselves during their rainy season in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. Furthermore, it is a good idea for people in these places to request rain for Israel during Israel’s rainy season in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. What it amounts to, then, is that they recite the summer version of "Birkat Hashanim" all year round, and in "Shomeah Tefillah" they request rain in their rainy season for themselves and rain in Israel’s rainy season for the Land of Israel. (compiled with help from chaburas.org)

Thanksgiving in Halacha

Thanksgiving is here and that means time for a special HalachaBoy edition. While as Jews we are quite proficient in offering thanks (we do it a minimum of three times a day), are we allowed to celebrate this secular holiday named Thanksgiving? Rav Doniel Rapp, Rav in YU and one of the top three funniest Rabbis alive, [ I have to put Rav Dovid Orlofsky and Rav Neil Fleischman up there also) provided this insight into the matter: [ You can listen to the shiur here http://yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/706550/Rabbi_Dani_Rapp/Is_Thanksgiving_Kosher-_The_Halachic_Debate ] The source for the problem of Thanksgiving is the prohibition of Bechukosehem Lo Telechu – in the Goyim’s ways we should not follow.Now clearly we are allowed to breathe and have two eyes like the Goyim so what exactly is prohibited? The gemara in Sanhedrim brings down there used to be a minhag that when Jewish kings would die they would burn all the kings possessions. However, the gemara asks shouldn’t that be a violation of Bechukosehem as the goyim do that also? And the gemara answers that since we did it first it’s ok. Interestingly the gemara in Avodah Zara asks same question but offers a different answer. That answer is that the prohibition of Bechokosehem only applies to senseless things (chukim) the goyim do, however the burning of the kings possessions was to show honor for the kings and thus even though the goyim do it, we can do it also. Tosfos in Avodah Zara asks the obvious question of why the Gemara offers two answers for one question, and answers that both apply. If the activity is for avodah zarah or immorality then we can’t do. If it is senseless, we can only do if we did it first. Thus, according to Tosfos wearing neck ties (which clearly serve no functional purpose) would be forbidden. In fact, the Vilna Gaon subscribed to this understanding. The Rama, quoting the Ran and Maharik, argues and says that only activities that encourage immodest or avodah zara behavior are forbidden. Further, any activity that you don’t know for sure the source you need to worry it has immoral connotations and thus forbidden. However, any activity that has a productive purpose, even if the goyim did it first, we can do. So doctors can wear white coats (as that labels them as MD’s and not janitors). Who do we follow? Well, simply look down and see if you’re wearing a tie. Most people now-a-days follow the Rama (Chassidim are the notable exception, which is ironic because that means they paskin like the Gra) and thus any activity that has a productive purpose, even if the goyim did it first, we can do. What about Thanksgiving? Well as Thanksgiving was enacted by President Abraham Lincoln after the civil war to create camaraderie and not for avodah zara or immorality it would seem that according to the Rama it would be no problem. Rav Moshe Feinstein in a number of responsa (spanning the years 1953-1991) discussed this issue and concluded that he thinks thanksgiving is just a regular secular holiday, and no different than labor day. Eating turkey on Thanksgiving should be allowed according to the Rama, provided you enjoy eating turkey, and are not just eating it because of Thanksgiving. In terms of turkeys being kosher for all year see a wonderful written article by Halachaboy in ParshaMan Parshas Shemini 2008 or just click here: http://parshaman.blogspot.com/2008/03/momma-shes-being-meanie-take-away-her.html

Chaya Sara: Salt on the Challah

As Halachaboy my goal is to provide halachos you might not be aware of, and to hopefully get your mind working to start thinking up these questions by yourself. So, let me ask you a question: Why do we put salt on our Challah on Shabbas? If you are like most people you probably remember learning that now-a-days since we don't have a Bais HaMikdash nor a Mizbeach, our household tables are considered miniature Mizbeachs. And just as every Karbon required an application of salt, so too we add salt to our Challah. This idea is based on the Medrash quoted by ParshaMan last week. The Medrash writes that the world is made up of three parts: one part desert, one part settled land, and one part sea. The sea said to G-d: "Master of the Universe! The Torah will be given in the desert; the Holy Temple will be built on settled land; and what about me?" Said G-d: "The people of Israel will offer your salt upon the Altar." But let me ask you two questions I have on this: 1. If this is true, why don't we put salt on every food item? If our tables our a Mizbeach, why is only Challah considered a Karbon and not every other food we eat? 2. Further, this idea can't be true because on Rosh Hashanah and for some of us through Sukkos instead of salt we put honey on our Challah and the pasuk in Vayikra (my bar mitzva parsha) clearly forbids the pouring of honey on the Mizbeach. Thus, I would like to offer two other reasons (one more practical, the other chassidish) as to why we add salt to our Challah on Shabbas: 1. Salt is used to give flavor. When making a bracha on something, one should try to make it on the best possible item. F or example, when you go to restaurant and you need to wash for your slice of pizza, you shouldn't make the Hamotzei on the soggy, stale bread waiting at the washing station. By waiting to make the bracha on your hot, yummy pizza it shows a respect for Hashem and the Bracha. So to when eating bread one should place salt on it first as a way of honoring the blessing, by making sure that the piece of bread you eat after saying the blessing is delicious. This follows the Torah idea that physical pleasure can be used as a vehicle in the service of Hashem. This, however, only applies if you would normally put salt on your bread to flavor it. 2. A second answer given is based on last week's parsha and the story of Lot and his wife. Why was it that Lot's wife turned into a pillar of salt? Perhaps, we can say that salt is not a necessity, it only enhances the food already there. While both Lot and his wife were committed to helping the needy and Hachnasos Orchim, they disagreed in how to perform such Chessed. Lot felt that guests should be treated as well as one's own family member, while his wife felt it was enough to sustain them and providing them the luxuries of life weren't required. Due to her stinginess, Lot's wife turned into salt. To rectify this bad trait, we go out of our way on Shabbas and Yuntif, when guests are present, to show our guests that not o nly are we going to provide them with their basic needs, but we are also going to go above and beyond and provide them with the tasty delicacies of life. This is the message we send by salting the Challah.

Parshas Vayera: Dabru Davar and Reading a Newspaper on Shabbas

Dear HalachaBoy, Can I read a newspaper on Shabbas? Every newspaper is filled with advertisements and business articles, and it is practically impossible to go through a paper without letting one of these catch your eyes. [Editor's note: A newspaper, itself, on Shabbas might be muktza for other reasons and thus prohibited to read or even move, but this article assumes those issues aren't present] We know that not only are there 39 Melachos on Shabbas, but there is also the concept of things not being "shabbish-dick." This idea is learnt from Yeshaya HaNavi and included in it is the prohibition of talking about items that you would only talk about during the week (i.e. driving a car, dealing in business). This prohibition is known as Dabru Davar. There is machlokes in the Rishonim as to why this prohibition exists. According to some Rishonim, talking about your weekly business is a violation of Kavod Shabbas. However, other Rishonim learn that the Rabbis prohibited talking about business because talking about a prohibited melacha will lead to violating the actual melacha. The Rambam brings down this Halacha, that it is forbidden to talk about business and weekly matters, however he mentions that only talking is forbidden yet thinking about such items are permissible. Rav Yaakov Emden, discusses this question of reading a newspaper on Shabbas and permits it because it is for pleasure, however if it is for business (the Wall St Journal or an ad) it is assur. Further, the Mishna Brura brings down that is assur to read the business section of the newspaper on Shabbas. But why is it assur? Isn't reading just thinking and the Rambam already told us only talking is prohibited but thinking is permitted? Rav Yisroel Reisman wanted to answer this based on the two understands we mentioned earlier. If the reason talking about weekly matters is prohibited is due to its lack of Kavod Shabbas, so too reading something on Shabbas shows a lack of Kavod Shabbas. And if you learn the other way, you are forced to say that reading is more parallel with talking than thinking and thus forbidden. When thinking, no one has any indication of what is going through your mind. However, when reading, not only can other people see what you are doing, but reading is actually a mode of communication just like talking. Thus, even if you learn that talking about business is prohibited because it will lead to violating the actual melacha, the same could be said for reading. For just as one is influenced by others through words of speech, so too is one influence from words of the pen. To conclude, reading a paper for enjoyment is allowed, however to read the business section and advertisements is a violation of Dabru Davar and thus should be avoided. Harav Nissan Karelitz writes on this subject: "While a ben Torah and his family should avoid reading a newspaper on Shabbos altogether, we do not object to those who are lenient and read the permissible parts of the newspaper. This is especially true with regard to women, children and those who do not engage in the study of Torah [who require a kosher alternative so that they will not come to engage in idle or forbidden talk or worse]; we definitely should not object to their reading the permissible parts of the newspaper."

Parshas Lech Lecha: Secular Marriages in Halacha

As HalachaBoy it is my goal to see the world through the prism of Halacha and when I saw this short article (from http://www.vosizneias.com/), I was so impressed I had to insert it in my weekly spot. I apologize to those that saw this article already and to those that were expecting an HalachaBoyOriginal, but if you really want something new- please email me at thehalachaboy@gmail.com and ill cook something up (Parshaman doesn't allow me two spots in a week--he's under a tight budget) New York City- Most people associate Tory Burch with $500 boots and the resurgence of 1960s fashion design. In four short years she has managed to build a veritable fashion design empire that has taken over the minds of teenage girls and married women... as well as the bank accounts of their fathers and husbands (or what's left of their bank accounts in light of the current economic downturn). Few, however, would identify her as a typical example of one of the tens of thousands of people that are the subject of a great halachic debate between Rav Yoseph Eliyahu Henkin, zt'l, (1881–1973) and Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt'l (1895–1986). What lies at the heart of this great debate are the following questions: How does the halachah view a secular (non-religious) Jewish marriage? And what happens if such a marriage dissolves? When a Jewish couple that was married either in the secular court system or by a non-Orthodox rabbi is divorced, rarely do they seek to also obtain a Jewish bill of divorce, called a get. This could present a problem for the woman's future marriage prospects and, unfortunately, for those of her children as well.Although Tory Burch (daughter of Reva Robinson and thus halachically Jewish) apparently received the last name she is now using from her marriage to Chris Burch (not a Jew), she was previously married to William Macklowe, a famous real-estate developer who is also halachically Jewish. The marriage did not succeed, and it ended rather quickly in a secular divorce. The question is, though: What is the halachic status of this first marriage? Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses this issue in Igros Moshe (Even HaEzer, vol. IV, No. 59; he discusses the issue in general, not Ms. Burch's particular circumstances). In discussing these types of marriages in a letter to Rabbi Nissan Alpert, zt'l, Rav Moshe is of the opinion that since the original wedding was, in all probability, never made with any halachic validity, the need for a halachic get is not imperative. A halachic wedding requires a woman to receive an item of value accompanied by the Jewish declaration of marriage in the presence of two Sabbath-observing witnesses. If there were no Sabbath-observing witnesses present when the ring was given and the declaration made, there is no halachic wedding, states Rav Moshe. Rav Henkin, on the other hand, disagrees. He quotes a principle of the Talmud (Gittin 81b and codified in Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 26:1) that a person does not generally wish that his marriage not be legitimate. The Mishnah there in Gittin explains that, according to Beis Hillel, if a man divorces his wife but subsequently remains with her in a pundaki (an inn), a get is required. The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 149:1) rules in accordance with Beis Hillel. Rav Henkin extends this ruling to cases such as the one mentioned above, as well. He points out that, although no longer practiced, there are ways of enacting a halachic marriage other than with the use of a ring (see the first Mishnah in tractate Kiddushin), and this is what is at play both in our case and in the Mishnah in Gittin. Since the members of this married couple are living together as a married couple, and the world views them as such, we have all the elements of a halachic marriage. What are the elements? The three elements are (1) kosher witnesses; (2) a valid method of effectuating marriage; and (3) the declaration of marriage. In Rav Henkin's view, who are the "kosher witnesses"? The witnesses are the entire world, including Sabbath-observing neighbors and friends that see them acting as a married couple. Rav Henkin refers to another Talmudic principle called an "anan sahadi," which literally means "we [all] testify." In his view, witnesses do not actually have to see it, but knowing it with certitude is sufficient. Where is the declaration of marriage? According to Rav Henkin, there is a tacit, unspoken declaration of marriage that is based on the fact that a person does not wish his marriage to be invalid. Thus, when there is another method of effectuating the marriage—living together as husband and wife—Rav Henkin rules that the tacit declaration is the accompanying secondary marriage effectuation. Although it may sound somewhat strange, Rav Henkin's position is not so novel. Poskim have discussed the notion of savlanos, sending gifts to one's new bride, as a problem, and the issue is extended beyond the case of the Mishnah in Gittin.How have the poskim viewed this great halachic debate? Rav Moshe Feinstein himself writes that ideally one should require a get in order to satisfy the other view as well. Rav Ovadiah Yosef also requires a get under ideal circumstances. However, the challenges of arranging for a get when the husband is truly not around allows for leniencies, according to both Rabbi Feinstein and Rav Yosef.Does it really matter for Tory Burch? Would it make a difference for her? Perhaps yes. It seems that she has been dating Jewish men since her divorce. She has dated both an Israeli designer and an American Jewish businessman. So the next time you spend $500 bucks on a pair of boots, make sure it comes with a Get.

Parshas Noach: Abortion

In honor of the upcoming presidential election this week I would like to discuss a hot topic that has been debated at great detail by the candidates (I haven't watched or heard any of the debates but I assume it's a hot topic because it always is): a⋅bor⋅tion   / Pronunciation [uh-bawr-shuh n] –noun 1.Also called voluntary abortion. the removal of an embryo or fetus from the uterus in order to end a pregnancy What is the Torah's view on abortion? But before we get to that, what is the typical Jewish college student's view on abortion?COLLEGE-AGE JEWS FOUND SIGNIFICANTLY MORE PRO-ABORTION THAN NON-JEWSWASHINGTON, August 2, 2002 (LSN.ca) - In a major survey with stark implications for conservative Jewish leaders, researchers have found that Jewish college students are generally much more pro-abortion than their non-Jewish counterparts. Data from freshmen at 424 U.S. colleges in 1999 was analyzed by researchers at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). The study by Linda J. Sax of UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute compared responses from 8,000 Jewish students and 232,000 non-Jewish students finding that 89.3% of Jewish students agreed that "abortion should be legal" compared to 52.3% of non-Jews. When I first read this I was shocked and appalled by how far some of our brothers and sisters have fallen. However, after some thinking I realized that this is perfectly logical. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (47a) tells us that a non-jew who kills a fetus is punished by death. However, a jew that kills a fetus, while a very deplorable and heinous crime, is not sentenced to death. Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that aborting a fetus is considered murder, however, capital punishment is not meted out against the aborted. Rav Matissyahu Blum, in his Sefer Torah La'daas, discusses this issue and rules that the sin for killing the fetus goes to the doctor, while the pregnant mother violates Lifnei Ever. He further quotes that in order to be sentenced to death the fetus must be forty days old. What if the mother is in danger? If the mother is Jewish then we save her over her child, for aborting the fetus is not as serious a crime as killing the mother. However, if we just said that aborting a non-jewish fetus is punished by death (as is the case if you kill a non-jew), who takes priority? The Minchas Chinuch asks this question and seems to conclude that in such a case it is prohibited for a non-jewish doctor to abort the fetus. However the Sefer Koach Shor rules that we view the fetus as a Rodef, a pursuer wanton on killing its mother. Thus while normally killing a non-jewish fetus is punishable by death, if the fetus is a Rodef, a different set of rules apply and we say that anyone, even a non-jew, is allowed to kill it.Thus to conclude, as a general rule, abortion in Judaism is permitted only if there is a direct threat to the life of the mother by carrying the fetus to term or through the act of childbirth. And while aborting a fetus is a very horrible crime, it is not a capital crime. So while it is very sad that some yidden are so far away from yiddishkeit, it comforting to know they are still learning Gemara.

Parshas Breishis: Gashem or Geshem

It's a bigger fight than Ali-Frazer, has more ramifications than USA-Russia, and is even larger than the current US election. It rears it ugly head at this point int the year. Any guesses what it is?It is the age old fight between Geshem and Gashem. This past Wednesday we started saying Mashiv HaRuach in the Shemona Eshrei, and even Artscroll writes that some people say Morid HaGeshem (with a segol ) while others say Morid HaGashem (with a Kamatz ). Segol sounds like an "eh" and looks like this . . . Kamatz sounds like "ah" and looks like this T So which one is correct? Rav Geneck, of the OU and Rosh Yeshiva of YU, qoutes in his Sefer from Rav Soloveichick that this argument is really an argument in two Gemaras. The Bavli Gemara in Berachos says that if one forgot Mashiv Haruach, he cannot make it up in Shema Koleinu and thus if he finished the Bracha of where Mashiv Haruach should be (Mchayei Mesim) he must repeat Shemona Esrei. However, the Yerusalmi Berachos says that just as one can insert V'Ten Tal in Shema Kolenu if he forgot it in its right place (Barech Alenu) so too he can make up Mashiv Haruach if he forgot it in its proper place. Rav Soloveichick wanted to learn this argument was based on the following: When one adds Mashiv Haruach to the Bracha of Mchayei Mesim, do we view those added words as an integral component of the Bracha ( Etzem Habracha), or are they just an addition but do not affect the actual text of the Bracha (Hazkara B'toch HaBracha). According to the Bavli, Mashiv Haruach is an integral component of the Bracha and thus if you forgot to say it in Mchayei Masim it is as if you forgot to say any other part of the Bracha. And just as if you forget to say Hashem's name, for example, you must repeat the Bracha so too here if you forget Mashiv Haruach you must go back. However, the Yerusalmi learns that it is just an addition, having no affect on the core Bracha. Since by forgetting Mashiv Haruach you haven't messed up the core Bracha, it is enough to insert in Shema Koleinu. Based on this Rav Geneck ruled that since we follow the opinion that if you forgot Mashiv Haruach in Mechaya Mesim you must go back to the beginning (like the Bavli) we also rule that Mashiv Haruach is not an addition, but an integral part of the Bracha. Since it is an integral part of the Bracha one should pronounce Geshem with the Segel, which is used to show continution, and not a Kamatz (Gashem) which is used to show the end of an idea. However, based on this I don't know why anyone says Gashem, with a Kamatz. I would love to know if anyone knows. ( thehalachaboy@gmail.com )

Simchas Torah: Standing During Hakafos

I wanted to discuss the Halachos of Hakafos and an issue many people seem to be very lax in. The Gemara in Berachos learns through a kal v'chomer that if one is required to stand for a Rabbi, that surely one is required for a Torah (if we stand for those who even learn it, then for it (the torah) we should surely stand. The Rambam records this as Halacha as follows " one is required to stand for a Torah that is in motion, until the Torah is set in its place or the Torah travels to a distance where he can no longer see it. During the year we never have a problem with this, and we always stand when the Torah is taken from the Aron and when it is brought back. Standing during Laining, is a separate issue beyond the scope of this article, but as the Torah is not moving during Laining, in regards to this issue it is totally permissible to sit. However, on Simchas Torah, when we dance with the Torah for hours, shouldn't everyone be required to stand also? You might be allowed to not dance, but to sit during the Hakafos seems to be a clear violation of this Halacha. There seems to be three solutions to this problem, and while it is definitely ideal to remain standing and dancing if one needs a break he should try to avail himself of one of these three solutions: 1. Different Platform- The Rashba brings down that if the Torah is on a different level (presumably at least 3 tefachim, one foot) one is not required to stand for it. This is based of the Halachos of Reshus (domains) and since the Torah is in separate domain than you, even though you can see it, you are not required to stand. Thus, when the Torah is on the Bima or the stage (like in the YIWH main shul) one may sit. Further, if while the Torah is being danced with on the floor one may go sit on an area elevelated or sunk in a foot. 2.- Elderly and Sick- Rav Ovadia Yosef is quoted as allowing those that are unable to stand for the whole Hakafos to sit in between Hakafos, when the Torah isn't really be moved rather just handed off. However, Rav Yosef adds if you are healthy you should still stand from when the Torah is taken out of the Aron until it is placed back later. 3.- A People Mechitza- The Teshuvos V'Hanhagos brings down another leniency based off a Gemara in Eruvin. The Gemara says that one is allowed to create a Mechitza out of people. Thus, since the people holding the Torah are in the middle and there is usually at least one circle surrounding them, one may sit outside of this circle. For there is a Mechitza between the sitter and the Torah. (Unclear, if you would have to make sure no one leaves the circle, and that everyone is holding hands or shoulders, however). However, I fill it is better for someone to rely on one of these weak leniency's then to leave the shul altogether. For while outside the shul one is definitely not required to stand- he is also missing the whole boat of what this Yuntif is about. In the spirit of Yuntif I would like to provide a further answer, which is definitely not to be relied on L'Halacha. As we mentioned earlier, once the Torah is returned to its place (the Aron or Bima) one is not required to stand. However, on Simchas Torah, after the uplifting month of Elul, Rosh Hashana, Aseres Yimei Teshuva, Yom Kippur and Sukkas we have reached a level where the home of the Torah is not the Aron but in our embrace. On Simchas Torah we hug and kiss the Torah, like our dear children. The Torah isn't in motion the Torah is in its home- in our arms. Thus, just as one is not required to stand for Aron moving with a Torah inside it. So too, on Simchas Torah when we reach a level where we realize that the Torah constantly belongs in our arms- we are not required to stand. I would just like to conclude with a short story of the Brisker Rav. On Simchas Torah, when the Brisker Rav started dancing with the Torah he wouldn't let go or pass to someone else until that someone actually came over and physically asked and took it from him. The Brisker Rav said " if I was holding precious gems I would want to hold on to them for as long as possible, why is it on Simchas Torah many people try to dispatch of the Torah so quickly?" Have a good yuntif.