Women and Zimun

There is a misconception that if three or more women eat a bread meal together there is no requirement of zimun. Further, many feel that those women that do zimun are a product of the 20th century feminist movement and have no basis in halacha.

 

The truth is that the Gemara in Brachos (45b) says that women may perform a zimun by themselves. The Rosh, in fact, rules that this gemara implies a requirement on women benching to also have a zimun. Tosfos and the Shulchan Aruch, however, learn that this is not a requirement  of women but merely an option. There is no one that says it is forbidden for women to have a zimun (obviously, as this would go against the gemara).

 

The Shulchan Aruch does rule that if there is already a zimun of men, women should join them and answer along. However, if there is only one or two men and three or more women, and the women decide to do a zimun, what should the men do?

 

Rav Shlomo Zalman (as quoted by his nephew in Halichos Beisah) rules that men should answer like they normally do.

 

Rav Dovid Feinstein Shlita, as quoted by Rav Dov Frimmer, rules that men can answer as outsiders and say "Barukh u-mevorach shmo tamid le-olam va'ed",which is what one answers to a zimmun if he didn't eat bread or cake (another Halacha very few people know, and we might discuss next week)

 

The concept that men should walk out and not answer at all, is attributed to a sefer Ha'Isha V'Hamitzvos and is unsupported.

 

So why don't the majority of women bench with a zimun now-a-days? Shouldn't they want to do it, even if merely optional?

 

Rav Moshe Feinstein, in discussing whether men have to wait for women when starting zimun, posits that since women are busy taking care of the the house and the children, they never really establish themselves as a permanent fixture in the meal. Thus, men should, however need not, wait for women for zimun. So too we can say that since women's eating is rushed, there is no requirement of zimun, for the requirement of zimun only sets in when having a permanence.

 

Rav Dovid Feinstein is of the opinion, (so I've heard) that since women used to not know the halachos of zimun nor could they read Hebrew, they never did it. And thus, it has become a minhag that women don't do zimun now-a-days, even though they can read Hebrew and be taught the halachos of zimun.

 

(Compiled with help from chaburas.org, Rav A. Zivotofsky, and Mail-Jewish)

 

Why no Al Hanissim in Al Hamichya?

On all jewish festivals there is a special insert we add into our bentching (ritzei, ya'aleh v'yavo and al hanissim). Usually, there is also a parallel insert into the al hamichya's we make. However, on Chanukah and Purim we only mention the holiday in benching and not in al ha'michya.

 

Why is that?

 

The following two answers are from Rav Flug, from YUTorah.org

R. Chaim Soloveitchik (cited in Haggadah Shel Pesach MiBeit Levi page 233) suggests that the reason why Chanukah and Purim are not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh is based on the concept of the compensatory beracha for Birkat HaMazon. The Gemara, Berachot 49a-b, provides a solution for one who omits R'tzei or Ya'aleh V'Yavo from the Birkat HaMazon of Shabbat and Yom Tov.  If one realizes the mistake after completing the beracha of Uv'nei Yerushalayim, but prior to reciting HaTov V'HaMeitiv, one can recite a compensatory beracha at that point and there is no need to return to the beginning of Birkat HaMazon. This beracha is only available for the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh.

R. Chaim explains that the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh (aka Al Hamichya) is an abridged form of all of the berachot of Birkat HaMazon. Anything that is not a beracha is not included in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. Although the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh don't normally appear as independent berachot, they have the potential to exist as independent berachot in the form of the compensatory beracha. Therefore, the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh are abridged and included in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. The additions for Chanukah and Purim (i.e. Al HaNissim) do not have a compensatory beracha and do not exist as independent berachot. Therefore, they are not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. [Based on this logic, R. Chaim explains why the additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh appear after Uv'nei Yerushalayim and not before. Although in the normal Birkat HaMazon, these additions appear before Uv'nei Yerushalayim, the compensatory beracha is recited after Uv'nei Yerushalayim. Therefore, one should view the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh as an abridged form of Birkat HaMazon when the compensatory beracha is recited and the logical placement for these additions is after Uv'nei Yerushalayim.]

R. Yosef D. Soloveitchik (cited in Harerei Kedem Vol. I, page 302 and Iggros HaGrid (Berachos 3:13)), presents a slightly different answer than that of his grandfather, R. Chaim. He suggests that the additions of Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh have a different status than the additions of Chanukah and Purim. On Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh, the function of the additions is to mention the day. The inherent kedushas hayom of the day is mechayev hazkarah. On Chanukah and Purim, which have no kedushas hayom (all types of melacha are allowed), the function of Al HaNissim is to provide a detailed account of G-d's providence in the Hoda'ah section of the Amidah and Birkat HaMazon. Therefore, the additions of Shabbat, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh are independent portions of Birkat HaMazon. Al HaNissim is not an independent portion of Birkat HaMazon, rather an extension of the Hoda'ah section. It is merely an expansion of the bracha of hodaah. Thus, Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh, whose purpose is to provide an abridged version of Birkat HaMazon, abridges all portions of Birkat HaMazon by providing the main idea of each portion. The additions for Shabbat, Yom Tov, and Rosh Chodesh are independent portions of Birkat HaMazon and are therefore abridged and included in Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh. However, Al HaNissim is not an independent portion and it is not the main idea of the Hoda'ah section. Therefore, it is not mentioned in the Beracha Mei'ain Shalosh.
 

Pas Haba B'Kisnin at Dessert

Last week we mentioned that the bracha of Hamotzi only exempts food that are for the sake of the meal (ie foods used to satiate), however, snack foods require their own bracha. Thus, it would seem that any mezonos dessert (assuming you are eating it not to fill you up) would require a beracha.
 
However,Rav Akiva Eiger says this really all depends. As we have mentioned previously there is a three way debate as to what exactly is Pas Haba B'kisnin. Not to get into the details but Pas Haba B'kisnin is considered a snack food and would require a Mezonos unless you are eating it for a meal, in which case you would wash make Hamotzi and Bench. The three opinions of what Pas Haba B'kisnin are:
1. Rashba- dough with a pocket filled with sweets (honey, jam, fruit)- like a Hamintoshin or fruit pie.
2. Rambam- dough enhanced with ingredients other than flour and water- like chocolate cake or zomick's challah.
3. Rav Hai Gaon- dough cooked to a point where it is dry, brittle and crunchy- like breadsticks or crackers.
 
While we normally assume that all three of these opinions are correct and we make a Mezonos on them, unless eating them as a meal, in the case of eating them for dessert we rule differently. Since, we have a concept of Safek Berachos L'hakel -- since berachos only d'rabanan when in doubt we don't say them-- unless we are sure this dessert item is a snack food we don't make a beracha on it.
 
Thus, while according to the Rambam cake is Pas Haba B'kisnin and considered a snack food, the Rashba himself would hold that cake is pure "bread" and thus would be exempt from a beracha due to the Hamotzi said earlier in the meal. So unless the dessert item fulfills all three criteria mentioned above, we err on the side of caution and don't make a beracha. Of course, there are many desserts that do contain all three criteria (chocolate wafers)
 
The Mishna Brurah argues and says that since we assume all three opinions are right, we are in fact assuming that any food covered in one of those opinions is for sure a Mezonos and would require a separate beracha.  

 

There are those as a way of avoiding this question who will bench prior to having dessert.
 

Fruits Eaten During a Bread Meal

I would like to demystify and clarify a very confusion halacha that comes about almost daily, and that is the issue of eating fruit during a meal.

The Gemara in Berachos (41b) writes that any food eaten in the course of a bread meal does not require a bracha, provided the food is for the meal. However, food eaten during a bread meal, that is not eaten for the meal, does require its own beracha, even though you already made a Hamotzi on the bread.

The issue that is raised and highly debated is how do we define if a certain food item is "for the meal" or "not for the meal." Rashi learns "for the meal" as any food eaten with bread. Thus, one would be required to make a separate bracha on every food item at the table not eaten with the bread (chulent, kugel, salad, etc.)

Tosfos, as explained by Rabbenu Yona, argues and defines "for the meal" as meal type foods. Meaning, any food normally eaten in the context of a meal is exempt from a beracha if one already made a Hamotzi on bread. However, food which is not normally eaten as a meal type food ("snack foods") would require a beracha if eaten in a bread meal, even though you already made a Hamotzi on the bread.

While this Tosfos explains why we don't make separate berachas on chulent, salad, and kugel, the big issue that is discussed is what about fruit. Fruit, generally, is characterised as a "snack type food" and thus might require a beracha even if eaten during a bread meal.

In order to clarify when fruit does and does not require a bracha we can analyze the following three cases:
1. Fruit eaten as the main course- When eating fruit as the main course, you effectively turn the fruit from a snack-type food, to a meal-type food and no beracha is required (provided you already said Homotzi).
2. Fruit eaten as one of the courses- Since you are eating other courses, the fruit can not be called the meal-food and thus retains its status as snack-type and would require a beracha, even if you already said Hamotzi.
3. Fruit eaten to whet your appetite- Apparently Chazal felt that certain fruits (grapefruit is the big discussion) increase your appetite for other food items (I would love to know if this is proven scientifically), and thus are considered secondary to the meal and thus no berachas are required.

To conclude, it would seem that most of the time fruit is served in a meal, it is served in a case 2 scenario, where it is just one of the courses, and thus would require its own beracha. Fruit served for dessert for sure requires its own beracha, as it is definitely a snack food.

So an apple a day, not only keeps the doctor away, it provided another opportunity to thank Hashem for His kindness.

(Next week i'yh we will discuss if a beracha is required on Mezonos desserts)

V'sen Tal: Why December 4th?

Though both the mention of rain and request for rain are inserted in the winter, there is a difference between them. Mention of rain (mashiv haruach) is inserted during the rainy season, and the request for rain (v’sen tal u’matar l’bracha) is made at that time when we desire rainfall. We begin mentioning rain (mashiv haruach) on Shmini Atzeres. Though it would make sense to mention rain during the Succot festival (as that is the beginning of the raining season), we nonetheless refrain from doing so. This is because rain is considered a bad omen during the festival since it makes it impossible to fulfill the commandment of sitting in the succah. Therefore, the sages ruled that our praise for rain begin after the Succot festival (Shemini Atzeres). What is more, they decided that this would take place during the Mussaf prayer when all are present and it is possible to make an announcement reminding everybody to begin mentioning rain. The evening prayer was not chosen because not everybody attends it; the morning prayer was likewise ruled out because it is impossible to make an announcement before it, for it is forbidden to interrupt between the Shema (geulah) and the Amida (tefilla) (Beit Yosef, Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 112:1, 2). However, the sages delayed the request for rain fifteen days (v’sen tal), to the night of the seventh of Cheshvan. They did this in order that the last of the festival pilgrims be able reach home before the rains fall (Gemara Ta’anis 10a). This custom continues even after the destruction of the Holy Temple because any custom which recalls the great days when the Holy Temple stood is very dear to us, and we do not wish to discontinue it. Only after the Temple is rebuilt (speedily in our days!) will the Sanhedrin be able to change the time for requesting rain taking into account modern means of transportation. In Babylon, the sages ruled that the request for rain should be delayed for sixty days after the Autumnal Equinox. This was because they had plenty of water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and therefore did not need to make numerous requests for rain with the onset of the rainy season. According to the Shulchan Aruch all other lands outside of Israel (America) follow the practice of Babylon and begin requesting rain on the sixtieth day after the Autumnal Equinox However, we must ask the obvious question, the autumnal equinox is September 22nd, sixty days later is November 22nd, so how did we arrive at the custom to begin the recitation of v’sen tal on December 4th? The answer to this question requires a historical background. In the year 46 BCE, Julius Caesar established what became known as the Julian Calendar. This calendar had 12 months, and one year had 365.25 days. Every four years, the quarter-days appeared on the calendar as a leap year day. However, the actual length of a solar year is slightly less than this, approximately 365.24219 days. In the short run, this difference is negligible, but over time it adds up ( you end up a day behind approximately every 150 years). This eventually caused a problem with regard to the seasons, which depended on the solar year and were gradually failing to fall out at the proper time. To fix this situation, Pope Gregory XIII, in 1582, instituted the Gregorian calendar. Two changes were made with the change in calendar. The first is that 10 days were "lost," meaning that October 4th that year was followed by October 15th (which makes sense as approximately 1500 years had passed, they were 10 days behind). With regard to our issue, v'sein tal u'matar that year was said on December 1st instead of November 22nd. The second change that was made was more subtle, but is perhaps more important. The rule for leap years was altered slightly, with every century year NOT divisible by 400 losing its leap-year status. Thus, 1600 was a leap year, but 1700, 1800, and 1900 were not. This had the effect of changing the average length of a year to 365.2425 days, a difference that is much less noticeable over time (a margin of error of roughly 3 days in 10,000 years). As a result, the date for v'tein tal u'matar was bumped up one day in each of those three years (1700, 1800 and 1900) ( We didn’t bump up in 2000 because that is divisible by 4 and thus was a leap year), bringing us to our current date of December 4th (thus, after 2100, the date will become December 5th). The only exception to be aware of is that v'tein tal u'matar is added beginning from December 5th in the Diaspora when the following Gregorian year is a leap year. This is due to the fact that the Jewish year begins several months earlier and factors in the extra day from the beginning (This relates to the fact that the Jewish calendar is based on both the solar and the lunar ones). In southern hemisphere countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Australia, where the rainy season coincides with Israel’s summer, Torah authorities rule that the request for rain be made in the "Birkat Hashanim" blessing according to the custom of the Land of Israel. This is because the Land of Israel is the focal point of creation and all other lands are subordinate to her. However, if in these southern hemisphere countries there are places where rain causes damage in the summer, it is impossible for the people there to request rain in "Birkat Hashanim." They should therefore recite the summer version all year round, and request rain in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. The reason that they are not able to request rain in "Birkat Hashanim" during their rainy season is that they must follow the practice of the Land of Israel. And they cannot request rain in "Birkat Hashanim" during Israel’s rainy season because rain is deleterious for them at this time. Therefore, they request rain for themselves during their rainy season in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. Furthermore, it is a good idea for people in these places to request rain for Israel during Israel’s rainy season in the "Shomeah Tefillah" blessing. What it amounts to, then, is that they recite the summer version of "Birkat Hashanim" all year round, and in "Shomeah Tefillah" they request rain in their rainy season for themselves and rain in Israel’s rainy season for the Land of Israel. (compiled with help from chaburas.org)

Thanksgiving in Halacha

Thanksgiving is here and that means time for a special HalachaBoy edition. While as Jews we are quite proficient in offering thanks (we do it a minimum of three times a day), are we allowed to celebrate this secular holiday named Thanksgiving? Rav Doniel Rapp, Rav in YU and one of the top three funniest Rabbis alive, [ I have to put Rav Dovid Orlofsky and Rav Neil Fleischman up there also) provided this insight into the matter: [ You can listen to the shiur here http://yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/706550/Rabbi_Dani_Rapp/Is_Thanksgiving_Kosher-_The_Halachic_Debate ] The source for the problem of Thanksgiving is the prohibition of Bechukosehem Lo Telechu – in the Goyim’s ways we should not follow.Now clearly we are allowed to breathe and have two eyes like the Goyim so what exactly is prohibited? The gemara in Sanhedrim brings down there used to be a minhag that when Jewish kings would die they would burn all the kings possessions. However, the gemara asks shouldn’t that be a violation of Bechukosehem as the goyim do that also? And the gemara answers that since we did it first it’s ok. Interestingly the gemara in Avodah Zara asks same question but offers a different answer. That answer is that the prohibition of Bechokosehem only applies to senseless things (chukim) the goyim do, however the burning of the kings possessions was to show honor for the kings and thus even though the goyim do it, we can do it also. Tosfos in Avodah Zara asks the obvious question of why the Gemara offers two answers for one question, and answers that both apply. If the activity is for avodah zarah or immorality then we can’t do. If it is senseless, we can only do if we did it first. Thus, according to Tosfos wearing neck ties (which clearly serve no functional purpose) would be forbidden. In fact, the Vilna Gaon subscribed to this understanding. The Rama, quoting the Ran and Maharik, argues and says that only activities that encourage immodest or avodah zara behavior are forbidden. Further, any activity that you don’t know for sure the source you need to worry it has immoral connotations and thus forbidden. However, any activity that has a productive purpose, even if the goyim did it first, we can do. So doctors can wear white coats (as that labels them as MD’s and not janitors). Who do we follow? Well, simply look down and see if you’re wearing a tie. Most people now-a-days follow the Rama (Chassidim are the notable exception, which is ironic because that means they paskin like the Gra) and thus any activity that has a productive purpose, even if the goyim did it first, we can do. What about Thanksgiving? Well as Thanksgiving was enacted by President Abraham Lincoln after the civil war to create camaraderie and not for avodah zara or immorality it would seem that according to the Rama it would be no problem. Rav Moshe Feinstein in a number of responsa (spanning the years 1953-1991) discussed this issue and concluded that he thinks thanksgiving is just a regular secular holiday, and no different than labor day. Eating turkey on Thanksgiving should be allowed according to the Rama, provided you enjoy eating turkey, and are not just eating it because of Thanksgiving. In terms of turkeys being kosher for all year see a wonderful written article by Halachaboy in ParshaMan Parshas Shemini 2008 or just click here: http://parshaman.blogspot.com/2008/03/momma-shes-being-meanie-take-away-her.html

Chaya Sara: Salt on the Challah

As Halachaboy my goal is to provide halachos you might not be aware of, and to hopefully get your mind working to start thinking up these questions by yourself. So, let me ask you a question: Why do we put salt on our Challah on Shabbas? If you are like most people you probably remember learning that now-a-days since we don't have a Bais HaMikdash nor a Mizbeach, our household tables are considered miniature Mizbeachs. And just as every Karbon required an application of salt, so too we add salt to our Challah. This idea is based on the Medrash quoted by ParshaMan last week. The Medrash writes that the world is made up of three parts: one part desert, one part settled land, and one part sea. The sea said to G-d: "Master of the Universe! The Torah will be given in the desert; the Holy Temple will be built on settled land; and what about me?" Said G-d: "The people of Israel will offer your salt upon the Altar." But let me ask you two questions I have on this: 1. If this is true, why don't we put salt on every food item? If our tables our a Mizbeach, why is only Challah considered a Karbon and not every other food we eat? 2. Further, this idea can't be true because on Rosh Hashanah and for some of us through Sukkos instead of salt we put honey on our Challah and the pasuk in Vayikra (my bar mitzva parsha) clearly forbids the pouring of honey on the Mizbeach. Thus, I would like to offer two other reasons (one more practical, the other chassidish) as to why we add salt to our Challah on Shabbas: 1. Salt is used to give flavor. When making a bracha on something, one should try to make it on the best possible item. F or example, when you go to restaurant and you need to wash for your slice of pizza, you shouldn't make the Hamotzei on the soggy, stale bread waiting at the washing station. By waiting to make the bracha on your hot, yummy pizza it shows a respect for Hashem and the Bracha. So to when eating bread one should place salt on it first as a way of honoring the blessing, by making sure that the piece of bread you eat after saying the blessing is delicious. This follows the Torah idea that physical pleasure can be used as a vehicle in the service of Hashem. This, however, only applies if you would normally put salt on your bread to flavor it. 2. A second answer given is based on last week's parsha and the story of Lot and his wife. Why was it that Lot's wife turned into a pillar of salt? Perhaps, we can say that salt is not a necessity, it only enhances the food already there. While both Lot and his wife were committed to helping the needy and Hachnasos Orchim, they disagreed in how to perform such Chessed. Lot felt that guests should be treated as well as one's own family member, while his wife felt it was enough to sustain them and providing them the luxuries of life weren't required. Due to her stinginess, Lot's wife turned into salt. To rectify this bad trait, we go out of our way on Shabbas and Yuntif, when guests are present, to show our guests that not o nly are we going to provide them with their basic needs, but we are also going to go above and beyond and provide them with the tasty delicacies of life. This is the message we send by salting the Challah.

Parshas Vayera: Dabru Davar and Reading a Newspaper on Shabbas

Dear HalachaBoy, Can I read a newspaper on Shabbas? Every newspaper is filled with advertisements and business articles, and it is practically impossible to go through a paper without letting one of these catch your eyes. [Editor's note: A newspaper, itself, on Shabbas might be muktza for other reasons and thus prohibited to read or even move, but this article assumes those issues aren't present] We know that not only are there 39 Melachos on Shabbas, but there is also the concept of things not being "shabbish-dick." This idea is learnt from Yeshaya HaNavi and included in it is the prohibition of talking about items that you would only talk about during the week (i.e. driving a car, dealing in business). This prohibition is known as Dabru Davar. There is machlokes in the Rishonim as to why this prohibition exists. According to some Rishonim, talking about your weekly business is a violation of Kavod Shabbas. However, other Rishonim learn that the Rabbis prohibited talking about business because talking about a prohibited melacha will lead to violating the actual melacha. The Rambam brings down this Halacha, that it is forbidden to talk about business and weekly matters, however he mentions that only talking is forbidden yet thinking about such items are permissible. Rav Yaakov Emden, discusses this question of reading a newspaper on Shabbas and permits it because it is for pleasure, however if it is for business (the Wall St Journal or an ad) it is assur. Further, the Mishna Brura brings down that is assur to read the business section of the newspaper on Shabbas. But why is it assur? Isn't reading just thinking and the Rambam already told us only talking is prohibited but thinking is permitted? Rav Yisroel Reisman wanted to answer this based on the two understands we mentioned earlier. If the reason talking about weekly matters is prohibited is due to its lack of Kavod Shabbas, so too reading something on Shabbas shows a lack of Kavod Shabbas. And if you learn the other way, you are forced to say that reading is more parallel with talking than thinking and thus forbidden. When thinking, no one has any indication of what is going through your mind. However, when reading, not only can other people see what you are doing, but reading is actually a mode of communication just like talking. Thus, even if you learn that talking about business is prohibited because it will lead to violating the actual melacha, the same could be said for reading. For just as one is influenced by others through words of speech, so too is one influence from words of the pen. To conclude, reading a paper for enjoyment is allowed, however to read the business section and advertisements is a violation of Dabru Davar and thus should be avoided. Harav Nissan Karelitz writes on this subject: "While a ben Torah and his family should avoid reading a newspaper on Shabbos altogether, we do not object to those who are lenient and read the permissible parts of the newspaper. This is especially true with regard to women, children and those who do not engage in the study of Torah [who require a kosher alternative so that they will not come to engage in idle or forbidden talk or worse]; we definitely should not object to their reading the permissible parts of the newspaper."

Parshas Lech Lecha: Secular Marriages in Halacha

As HalachaBoy it is my goal to see the world through the prism of Halacha and when I saw this short article (from http://www.vosizneias.com/), I was so impressed I had to insert it in my weekly spot. I apologize to those that saw this article already and to those that were expecting an HalachaBoyOriginal, but if you really want something new- please email me at thehalachaboy@gmail.com and ill cook something up (Parshaman doesn't allow me two spots in a week--he's under a tight budget) New York City- Most people associate Tory Burch with $500 boots and the resurgence of 1960s fashion design. In four short years she has managed to build a veritable fashion design empire that has taken over the minds of teenage girls and married women... as well as the bank accounts of their fathers and husbands (or what's left of their bank accounts in light of the current economic downturn). Few, however, would identify her as a typical example of one of the tens of thousands of people that are the subject of a great halachic debate between Rav Yoseph Eliyahu Henkin, zt'l, (1881–1973) and Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt'l (1895–1986). What lies at the heart of this great debate are the following questions: How does the halachah view a secular (non-religious) Jewish marriage? And what happens if such a marriage dissolves? When a Jewish couple that was married either in the secular court system or by a non-Orthodox rabbi is divorced, rarely do they seek to also obtain a Jewish bill of divorce, called a get. This could present a problem for the woman's future marriage prospects and, unfortunately, for those of her children as well.Although Tory Burch (daughter of Reva Robinson and thus halachically Jewish) apparently received the last name she is now using from her marriage to Chris Burch (not a Jew), she was previously married to William Macklowe, a famous real-estate developer who is also halachically Jewish. The marriage did not succeed, and it ended rather quickly in a secular divorce. The question is, though: What is the halachic status of this first marriage? Rav Moshe Feinstein discusses this issue in Igros Moshe (Even HaEzer, vol. IV, No. 59; he discusses the issue in general, not Ms. Burch's particular circumstances). In discussing these types of marriages in a letter to Rabbi Nissan Alpert, zt'l, Rav Moshe is of the opinion that since the original wedding was, in all probability, never made with any halachic validity, the need for a halachic get is not imperative. A halachic wedding requires a woman to receive an item of value accompanied by the Jewish declaration of marriage in the presence of two Sabbath-observing witnesses. If there were no Sabbath-observing witnesses present when the ring was given and the declaration made, there is no halachic wedding, states Rav Moshe. Rav Henkin, on the other hand, disagrees. He quotes a principle of the Talmud (Gittin 81b and codified in Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 26:1) that a person does not generally wish that his marriage not be legitimate. The Mishnah there in Gittin explains that, according to Beis Hillel, if a man divorces his wife but subsequently remains with her in a pundaki (an inn), a get is required. The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 149:1) rules in accordance with Beis Hillel. Rav Henkin extends this ruling to cases such as the one mentioned above, as well. He points out that, although no longer practiced, there are ways of enacting a halachic marriage other than with the use of a ring (see the first Mishnah in tractate Kiddushin), and this is what is at play both in our case and in the Mishnah in Gittin. Since the members of this married couple are living together as a married couple, and the world views them as such, we have all the elements of a halachic marriage. What are the elements? The three elements are (1) kosher witnesses; (2) a valid method of effectuating marriage; and (3) the declaration of marriage. In Rav Henkin's view, who are the "kosher witnesses"? The witnesses are the entire world, including Sabbath-observing neighbors and friends that see them acting as a married couple. Rav Henkin refers to another Talmudic principle called an "anan sahadi," which literally means "we [all] testify." In his view, witnesses do not actually have to see it, but knowing it with certitude is sufficient. Where is the declaration of marriage? According to Rav Henkin, there is a tacit, unspoken declaration of marriage that is based on the fact that a person does not wish his marriage to be invalid. Thus, when there is another method of effectuating the marriage—living together as husband and wife—Rav Henkin rules that the tacit declaration is the accompanying secondary marriage effectuation. Although it may sound somewhat strange, Rav Henkin's position is not so novel. Poskim have discussed the notion of savlanos, sending gifts to one's new bride, as a problem, and the issue is extended beyond the case of the Mishnah in Gittin.How have the poskim viewed this great halachic debate? Rav Moshe Feinstein himself writes that ideally one should require a get in order to satisfy the other view as well. Rav Ovadiah Yosef also requires a get under ideal circumstances. However, the challenges of arranging for a get when the husband is truly not around allows for leniencies, according to both Rabbi Feinstein and Rav Yosef.Does it really matter for Tory Burch? Would it make a difference for her? Perhaps yes. It seems that she has been dating Jewish men since her divorce. She has dated both an Israeli designer and an American Jewish businessman. So the next time you spend $500 bucks on a pair of boots, make sure it comes with a Get.

Parshas Noach: Abortion

In honor of the upcoming presidential election this week I would like to discuss a hot topic that has been debated at great detail by the candidates (I haven't watched or heard any of the debates but I assume it's a hot topic because it always is): a⋅bor⋅tion   / Pronunciation [uh-bawr-shuh n] –noun 1.Also called voluntary abortion. the removal of an embryo or fetus from the uterus in order to end a pregnancy What is the Torah's view on abortion? But before we get to that, what is the typical Jewish college student's view on abortion?COLLEGE-AGE JEWS FOUND SIGNIFICANTLY MORE PRO-ABORTION THAN NON-JEWSWASHINGTON, August 2, 2002 (LSN.ca) - In a major survey with stark implications for conservative Jewish leaders, researchers have found that Jewish college students are generally much more pro-abortion than their non-Jewish counterparts. Data from freshmen at 424 U.S. colleges in 1999 was analyzed by researchers at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). The study by Linda J. Sax of UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute compared responses from 8,000 Jewish students and 232,000 non-Jewish students finding that 89.3% of Jewish students agreed that "abortion should be legal" compared to 52.3% of non-Jews. When I first read this I was shocked and appalled by how far some of our brothers and sisters have fallen. However, after some thinking I realized that this is perfectly logical. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (47a) tells us that a non-jew who kills a fetus is punished by death. However, a jew that kills a fetus, while a very deplorable and heinous crime, is not sentenced to death. Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that aborting a fetus is considered murder, however, capital punishment is not meted out against the aborted. Rav Matissyahu Blum, in his Sefer Torah La'daas, discusses this issue and rules that the sin for killing the fetus goes to the doctor, while the pregnant mother violates Lifnei Ever. He further quotes that in order to be sentenced to death the fetus must be forty days old. What if the mother is in danger? If the mother is Jewish then we save her over her child, for aborting the fetus is not as serious a crime as killing the mother. However, if we just said that aborting a non-jewish fetus is punished by death (as is the case if you kill a non-jew), who takes priority? The Minchas Chinuch asks this question and seems to conclude that in such a case it is prohibited for a non-jewish doctor to abort the fetus. However the Sefer Koach Shor rules that we view the fetus as a Rodef, a pursuer wanton on killing its mother. Thus while normally killing a non-jewish fetus is punishable by death, if the fetus is a Rodef, a different set of rules apply and we say that anyone, even a non-jew, is allowed to kill it.Thus to conclude, as a general rule, abortion in Judaism is permitted only if there is a direct threat to the life of the mother by carrying the fetus to term or through the act of childbirth. And while aborting a fetus is a very horrible crime, it is not a capital crime. So while it is very sad that some yidden are so far away from yiddishkeit, it comforting to know they are still learning Gemara.

Parshas Breishis: Gashem or Geshem

It's a bigger fight than Ali-Frazer, has more ramifications than USA-Russia, and is even larger than the current US election. It rears it ugly head at this point int the year. Any guesses what it is?It is the age old fight between Geshem and Gashem. This past Wednesday we started saying Mashiv HaRuach in the Shemona Eshrei, and even Artscroll writes that some people say Morid HaGeshem (with a segol ) while others say Morid HaGashem (with a Kamatz ). Segol sounds like an "eh" and looks like this . . . Kamatz sounds like "ah" and looks like this T So which one is correct? Rav Geneck, of the OU and Rosh Yeshiva of YU, qoutes in his Sefer from Rav Soloveichick that this argument is really an argument in two Gemaras. The Bavli Gemara in Berachos says that if one forgot Mashiv Haruach, he cannot make it up in Shema Koleinu and thus if he finished the Bracha of where Mashiv Haruach should be (Mchayei Mesim) he must repeat Shemona Esrei. However, the Yerusalmi Berachos says that just as one can insert V'Ten Tal in Shema Kolenu if he forgot it in its right place (Barech Alenu) so too he can make up Mashiv Haruach if he forgot it in its proper place. Rav Soloveichick wanted to learn this argument was based on the following: When one adds Mashiv Haruach to the Bracha of Mchayei Mesim, do we view those added words as an integral component of the Bracha ( Etzem Habracha), or are they just an addition but do not affect the actual text of the Bracha (Hazkara B'toch HaBracha). According to the Bavli, Mashiv Haruach is an integral component of the Bracha and thus if you forgot to say it in Mchayei Masim it is as if you forgot to say any other part of the Bracha. And just as if you forget to say Hashem's name, for example, you must repeat the Bracha so too here if you forget Mashiv Haruach you must go back. However, the Yerusalmi learns that it is just an addition, having no affect on the core Bracha. Since by forgetting Mashiv Haruach you haven't messed up the core Bracha, it is enough to insert in Shema Koleinu. Based on this Rav Geneck ruled that since we follow the opinion that if you forgot Mashiv Haruach in Mechaya Mesim you must go back to the beginning (like the Bavli) we also rule that Mashiv Haruach is not an addition, but an integral part of the Bracha. Since it is an integral part of the Bracha one should pronounce Geshem with the Segel, which is used to show continution, and not a Kamatz (Gashem) which is used to show the end of an idea. However, based on this I don't know why anyone says Gashem, with a Kamatz. I would love to know if anyone knows. ( thehalachaboy@gmail.com )

Simchas Torah: Standing During Hakafos

I wanted to discuss the Halachos of Hakafos and an issue many people seem to be very lax in. The Gemara in Berachos learns through a kal v'chomer that if one is required to stand for a Rabbi, that surely one is required for a Torah (if we stand for those who even learn it, then for it (the torah) we should surely stand. The Rambam records this as Halacha as follows " one is required to stand for a Torah that is in motion, until the Torah is set in its place or the Torah travels to a distance where he can no longer see it. During the year we never have a problem with this, and we always stand when the Torah is taken from the Aron and when it is brought back. Standing during Laining, is a separate issue beyond the scope of this article, but as the Torah is not moving during Laining, in regards to this issue it is totally permissible to sit. However, on Simchas Torah, when we dance with the Torah for hours, shouldn't everyone be required to stand also? You might be allowed to not dance, but to sit during the Hakafos seems to be a clear violation of this Halacha. There seems to be three solutions to this problem, and while it is definitely ideal to remain standing and dancing if one needs a break he should try to avail himself of one of these three solutions: 1. Different Platform- The Rashba brings down that if the Torah is on a different level (presumably at least 3 tefachim, one foot) one is not required to stand for it. This is based of the Halachos of Reshus (domains) and since the Torah is in separate domain than you, even though you can see it, you are not required to stand. Thus, when the Torah is on the Bima or the stage (like in the YIWH main shul) one may sit. Further, if while the Torah is being danced with on the floor one may go sit on an area elevelated or sunk in a foot. 2.- Elderly and Sick- Rav Ovadia Yosef is quoted as allowing those that are unable to stand for the whole Hakafos to sit in between Hakafos, when the Torah isn't really be moved rather just handed off. However, Rav Yosef adds if you are healthy you should still stand from when the Torah is taken out of the Aron until it is placed back later. 3.- A People Mechitza- The Teshuvos V'Hanhagos brings down another leniency based off a Gemara in Eruvin. The Gemara says that one is allowed to create a Mechitza out of people. Thus, since the people holding the Torah are in the middle and there is usually at least one circle surrounding them, one may sit outside of this circle. For there is a Mechitza between the sitter and the Torah. (Unclear, if you would have to make sure no one leaves the circle, and that everyone is holding hands or shoulders, however). However, I fill it is better for someone to rely on one of these weak leniency's then to leave the shul altogether. For while outside the shul one is definitely not required to stand- he is also missing the whole boat of what this Yuntif is about. In the spirit of Yuntif I would like to provide a further answer, which is definitely not to be relied on L'Halacha. As we mentioned earlier, once the Torah is returned to its place (the Aron or Bima) one is not required to stand. However, on Simchas Torah, after the uplifting month of Elul, Rosh Hashana, Aseres Yimei Teshuva, Yom Kippur and Sukkas we have reached a level where the home of the Torah is not the Aron but in our embrace. On Simchas Torah we hug and kiss the Torah, like our dear children. The Torah isn't in motion the Torah is in its home- in our arms. Thus, just as one is not required to stand for Aron moving with a Torah inside it. So too, on Simchas Torah when we reach a level where we realize that the Torah constantly belongs in our arms- we are not required to stand. I would just like to conclude with a short story of the Brisker Rav. On Simchas Torah, when the Brisker Rav started dancing with the Torah he wouldn't let go or pass to someone else until that someone actually came over and physically asked and took it from him. The Brisker Rav said " if I was holding precious gems I would want to hold on to them for as long as possible, why is it on Simchas Torah many people try to dispatch of the Torah so quickly?" Have a good yuntif.

Parshas Netzavim: Pruzbul

Urgent Reminder: In less then a week any money you are owed, will no longer be owed to you. This is due to the concept of Shemta Kessafim (the release of monies) and as we are about to finish a Shemita year any money owed to you that you have not yet collected, will be nullified. There is one way to retain your claim and that is through the filling out of a document called a Pruzbal in front of 3 Jewish witnesses. See below for a nice refresher course (provided by Rav Tzvi Price) in the rules of Shemta and Pruzbal. Every community rabbi is aware of this issue, and is ready and willing to sit down with you and fill out the paperwork. Its a really short and easy process and unless you want to lose your claim to money that is rightfully yours HalachaBoy recommends you do it. But remember you have until next Monday afternoon, as once Rosh Hashana rolls in (Monday night) all debts are void: In Parshas Reeh the Torah states, "At the end of seven years you shall institute a Shemittah (release). . . Every creditor shall release his authority over what he has lent his fellow Jew; he shall not press his fellow Jew. . ." (Devarim 15:1-2) Chaza"l explain that these words present us with two commandments. 1. A positive commandment that we waive our right to collect any loans that were payable during the year of Shemittah. 2. A negative command that we refrain from demanding payment of those loans. Later on in the same passage (Devarim 15:9), the Torah obligates us in a third Shemittah commandment. There, the Torah states that we are not allowed to take into account the possibility that Shemittah may release the loan when considering whether to lend a fellow Jew money. These three mitzvos form the basis of Shemittas Kessafim- 'the release of monies'. Although the agricultural Shemittah only applies in the land of Israel, the mitzvos of Shemittas Kesafim are incumbent upon every Jew wherever he may find himself. On the surface, our present observance of Shemittas Kesafim bears little resemblance to that which the Torah describes. Unlike in olden times, today's Jewish courts rarely, if ever, enforce the release of a loan due to Shemittah. The Rabbinic enactment of the Pruzbal, which is a main cause for this change, is often misunderstood. Unfortunately, the procedure of making a Pruzbal often leaves the onlooker with the feeling that he had just witnessed some kind of magic which somehow makes the mitzvah of Shemittas Kesafim disappear. The purpose of this article is to demystify this often misunderstood subject. Let us ask a fundamental question regarding Shemittas Kesafim. In our day and age is our responsibility to keep the laws of Shemittas Kesafim a Torah obligation or a Rabbinic decree? The Rambam rules that today the observance of Shemittas Kesafim is no longer an obligation from the Torah. This is because the Torah made Shemittas Kesafim contingent on the observance of the laws of the Yovel, the Jubilee, which cannot be observed when we are in exile. Rather, our present observance of Shemittas Kesafim is a Rabbinic injunction. Chaza"l made this decree so that the Torah concept of Shemittas Kesafim would not be forgotten. The overwhelming majority of Halachic authorities agree with this ruling. The Ramban maintains a more stringent opinion. He rules that we are obligated to observe Shemittas Kesafim min haTorah even today. According to the Ramban, Shemittas Kesafim is not contingent on the Yovel observance. In fact, the Ramban openly states that even if today's agricultural Shemittah in the land of Israel is a Rabbinic injunction, the status of Shemittas Kesafim is still an obligation according to Torah law. At the other extreme, there is the opinion of the Baal HaMeor, who considers Shemittas Kesafim an obligatory custom in today's times. The Pruzbal Concept Due to the intervention of Chaza"l, Shemittas Kesafim as we know it today does not normally require any real financial loss. In fact, it has been that way since the times of Hillel the Elder, who was the leader of the generation that immediately preceded the destruction of the Second Temple. Hillel saw that the rich were refraining from lending to the poor because of a fear that their loans would be cancelled by Shemittah. In fact, this behavior is exactly what the Torah prohibited in Devarim 15:9 as we have learned. With his great wisdom, Hillel decided it was necessary to minimize the damage. He devised a legal instrument which would, in effect, circumvent Shemittas Kesafim while at the same time remain faithful to its underlying principles. Hillel's enactment saved the rich from flagrantly ignoring the prohibition of refusing to give a loan because of the fear of Shemittah. Now, they would be able to collect their money. Furthermore, Hillel's innovation was also intended to help the poor by alleviating the difficulty they had in obtaining loans. Hillel called this new innovation a Pruzbal, which is a shortened form of the Aramaic expression pruzbulti, 'an enactment for the rich and the poor.' How does Hillel's Pruzbal circumvent the laws of Shemittas Kesafim without transgression? Hillel used an existing halacha and then, with the authority that was given to him by the Torah, he extended it further, as will be explained. According to the Torah, Shemittas Kesafim only applies to a loan in which payment is being demanded solely by the lender himself and not when it is being done with the help of a Bais Din, a Jewish court. If, however, the lender had already entrusted collection of the loan to a Bais Din before the onset of Shemittas Kesafim, then that loan will not be subject to the laws of Shemitta. One explanation given for this halacha is that the Torah prohibition not to press a borrower for payment only refers to the lender himself but not to a Bais Din. Although this halacha does circumvent Shemittas Kesafim, widespread use of this loophole would prove quite impractical. This is due to the fact that the only legally recognized method by which a lender entrusts a Bais Din to collect the debt owed to him is by physically giving his loan document to the Bais Din. Typically, a lender would think twice before he relinquishes control of his loan document to anyone, including a Bais Din. The Halachic innovation of the Pruzbal allows the lender to make a verbal declaration in front of the Bais Din or in front of two witnesses in which he states that he entrusts the Bais Din to collect his debts for him. This takes the place of actually giving documents to the Bais Din. In fact, Hillel even ruled that a Pruzbal declaration can entrust a loan to Bais Din even when no loan document was written at all. The declaration must be written down and signed by the three judges that comprise the Bais Din or, alternatively, by two witnesses who hear the declaration. There is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of a Pruzbal that was made by verbal declaration but was not written down. By what authority did Hillel make this enactment? This is an especially difficult to understand according to the Ramban who maintains that Shemittas Kesafim is a Torah obligation even in our times. According to the Ramban, Hillel's Pruzbal is a direct contradiction to Torah Law! The Gemara asks this question. According to the Ramban, the Gemara answers that with regard to monetary matters, the Torah itself gives Bais Din the power to seize one individual's assets and give them to another if the court has a legitimate reason to do so. In effect, this is what Hillel did when he enacted the Pruzbal. In this sense, the Pruzbal does have an aspect of 'Rabbinic magic' to it. However, it is very important to understand that this 'magical power' was entrusted to them by the Torah to be used sparingly and with clearly defined guidelines. In its simplest form, the formulation of the Pruzbal declaration is quite short. It reads, 'I give over to you, the judges of the Bais Din, the authority to collect my debts so that through you I may collect any debt owed to me at any time I wish.' A number of Pruzbal forms have been published over the years. While all of them have this basic wording at their heart, there are differences between them. Some were written to cover specific situations. Others were created to deal with various Halachic concerns. One should consult with someone knowledgeable in the laws of Shemittas Kesafim in order to choose the Pruzbal form that is most appropriate for one's personal situation. Obviously, a Pruzbal must be made in a halachically correct fashion for it to be effective. According to both the Rambam and the Ramban whose opinions were discussed previously, if a Pruzbal is deemed invalid, then when Shemittas Kesafim arrives the money that was lent by the writer of that Pruzbal will be lost. This is because they both consider Shemittas Kesafim to be a full-fledged mitzvah and only disagree on wether it is a Torah obligation or a Rabbinic one in our times. However, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, zt"l, rules that when a significant financial loss would occur, the lender may rely on the more lenient opinion of the Baal HaMeor in order to demand payment. However, before relying on this opinion, a competent Halachic authority must be consulted. For a Pruzbal to be deemed valid it must be done through a Halachically valid convening of Bais Din. The judges should not be related to each other, nor to the lender or to the borrower. If by mistake this happens, one should consult with a Halachic authority. Furthermore, there exists a difference of opinion as to the stature required of a Bais Din before it is allowed to execute a Pruzbal. Some authorities permit using a Bais Din comprised of three people who know something of the laws of Shemittas Kesafim and Pruzbal. However, others rule that a Pruzbal can only be done in front of the recognized Bais Din of the city. If no such Bais Din exists in the city, then the Pruzbal can only be written by the most recognized Bais Din of the generation. One should ask someone familiar with the making of a Pruzbal as to how to accomplish this in a relatively simple way. It is praiseworthy for one to follow this second opinion if possible. When making a Pruzbal, an interesting stipulation regarding the status of the debtor should be kept in mind. A Pruzbal can only work when the debtor owns or rents at least a small piece of land. The rationale behind this Halacha is somewhat complex and beyond the scope of this article. When the borrower is completely supported by his parents as in the case of a young child or adolescent it is quite possible that he does not have legal ownership of any land. In such a case, competent Halachic advice should be sought. And finally, one might ask why this article is being presented now at the end of the Shemittah year. The answer is as follows. One of the Halachos of the Pruzbal is that it cannot be effective on money that was lent after the Pruzbal was written. This means that, in order to include all the loans that one has made, the Pruzbal should be written as close as possible to the time at which all loans are cancelled by the Shemittah. There is an opinion that sets that time at the beginning of the Shemittah year. In fact, there are those that are concerned for this opinion and therefore, make a Pruzbal immediately before the Shemittah year begins. However, the accepted opinion is that Shemittas Kesafim occurs at the end of the year. Therefore, the custom has developed to write the Pruzbal on the morning of the last day of the Shemittah year. If you haven't noticed, that day is fast approaching. If Halachaboy or Parshaman can be of any assistance, or if you don't have a community Rabbi to assist and would like to fill out a Pruzbul you know where to reach us (thehalachaboy@gmail.com or theparshaman@gmail.com)

Parshas Ki Tetsei- The Mitzvah to Have a Job

This weeks mid-week HalachaBoy edition comes from Hirhurim.com The mitzva to have a job and traveling during Shana Rishona There is a special mitzvah that applies to newly married couples. The Torah (Deut. 24:5) tells us that when people are called up to the army, newly married men are exempt for the first year of their marriages: כי יקח איש אשה חדשה לא יצא בצבא ולא יעבר עליו לכל דבר נקי יהיה לביתו שנה אחת ושמח את אשתו אשר לקח. When a man has taken a new wife, he shall not go out to war nor be charged with anything; he shall be free at home one year, and bring happiness to his wife whom he has taken. It is significant that the Torah uses repetitive language in this verse in that it says that a groom need not go to war nor "be charged with anything." What does this second phrase imply? The Gemara (Sotah 44a) understands this as meaning that a groom does not leave his wife for anything. The question is whether this "anything" means battle-related duties, i.e. national service, or literally anything. Rashi (Deut. 24:5) writes that it refers specifically to national service. However, the Sefer Ha-Chinukh (no. 581) explains at length that, in his view, a groom in his first year of marriage may not leave his wife for an extended period of time except for the purposes of a mitzvah (including an obligatory war) or -- seriously -- to have fun with his friends. This position of the Chinukh, as well as a mistranslation of the Rambam's Arabic Sefer Ha-Mitzvos (lavin 311), has led some authorities to rule that a groom may not leave his wife for a few days within the first year of marriage. In particular, the Chokhmas Adam (129:19) is strict about this. Others, such as the Minchas Chinukh (581:2), deny that this mitzvah applies to anything other than war. The Chasam Sofer (Responsa, EH vol. 2 no. 155) was asked by a man whether, in his first year of marriage, he may leave for a business trip. He was an importer and needed to buy his wares in a distant land in order to have merchandise to sell. The responsum does not specify but given that this man was in his first year of marriage and there is no mention of any children he needs to feed, it is probably safe to assume that we are dealing with only a question of a husband supporting himself and his wife. The Chasam Sofer responded that the Sefer Ha-Chinukh allows travel for a mitzvah. Since earning a living is a mitzvah, the man may travel for business. Let me repeat, the Chasam Sofer ruled in an halakhic context that earning a living is a mitzvah. This should not be surprising. It is, after all, one of the ten commandments (Ex. 20:8): "Six days you shall work..." The Avos De-Rabbi Nassan (version 2 ch. 21) derives from here an obligation to work.* It doesn't get more authoritative than the ten commandments.

Parshas Reah: Selling your Vote

From a recent AP story: MINNEAPOLIS (AP) " A college student claimed it was all a joke when he put his vote in this fall's presidential election up for sale on the Web auction site eBay. But prosecutors didn't see the humor. University of Minnesota student Max P. Sanders, 19, was charged with a felony Thursday in Hennepin County District Court after allegedly asking for a minimum of $10 in exchange for voting for the bidder's preferred candidate. ... Sanders was charged with one count of bribery, treating and soliciting under an 1893 state law that makes it a crime to offer to buy or sell a vote. ... The scarcely used law had its heyday in the 1920s, when many people sold their votes in exchange for liquor, Assistant County Attorney Pat Diamond said. ... The charge carries up to five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. What are the halachic issues raised by vote buying? The Chasam Sofer has a fascinating responsum on this topic (CM 160, cited by Pischei Teshuvah CM 8:1). A certain community (whose name he omits, presumably for the obvious reasons) had decided to utilize a certain voting procedure to choose from among four candidates for the position of Rabbi of the community. Subsequent to the implementation of the vote, rumors circulated that members of the community had received pecuniary consideration from relatives of the winner to vote for him, and there was even the discovery of an incriminating letter, purporting to be from a member of the community, which made clear reference to the scandalous arrangement. A great commotion ensued, the community split into two factions, and the Chasam Sofer attempted to act as peacemaker and settle the matter. Regarding the technical halachic question of the validity of the vote, the Chasam Sofer argues that it is absolutely certain that if the fact of the bribery can be established through the testimony of two impartial witnesses, then the vote is void. He infers this from a ruling of Rema (CM 163:1): "All communal needs, which cannot be agreed upon [by the members of the community], we confer with all the householders who pay tax, and they accept upon themselves that they will all express their views for the sake of Heaven, and they follow the majority." The Chasam Sofer argues that one who is paid to vote has not given his opinion 'for the sake of Heaven'. I have long wondered, however, as to what exactly is included in the requirement that they vote 'for the sake of Heaven'? E.g, if the community is considering the construction of a wall, and I am the local stonemason, must I attempt to sequester that fact and try to determine what I would recommend if I had no financial interest in the project? As far as I know, under American law, ordinary citizens voting in a civic election, as opposed to those elected or appointed as representatives of others and voting in that capacity, have no such obligation, and the law only forbids the direct purchase of votes. The Chasam Sofer additionally rules that if we establish through witnesses that a particular candidate had himself ordered the purchase of votes, he is thereby ineligible for any Rabbinic position until he repents. Rav Shlomoh Yehudah Tabak has another important responsum on this topic (Resp. Teshuras Shai II:56). The seven Tuvei Ha'ir of some community had reached a unanimous decision on a certain financial question within their purview, but one of them had been paid to vote the way he did, and the question therefore arose as to whether their decision was binding. Rav Tabak takes for granted that the vote of the compromised official does not count, and the thrust of his argument is to show that the entire vote is invalid even though the decision had been unanimous and the other six officials had not been tampered with. He reasons that Halachah requires the presence and participation of all members of a deliberative body even where the decision of a majority suffices. In our case, the purchased member must be considered as absent, and the vote is therefore invalid. Moreover, a corrupted member is actually even worse than an absent one, since the undue influence of the bribe may have spread to his colleagues through his persuading them of his position (see the actual responsum for the background and details of his arguments). This article has been brought to you courtesy of Bais HaVaad L'Inyonei Mishpat,and Halachaboy!

Parshas Eikev: Wearing a Gartel

HalachaSensei Joke I just made up- A karate sensei is really upset his son left the family karate business to pursue learning in Israel. The sensai calls up his son and says "Daniel Son, I just don't get you. You always take the easy way out." Daniel confused by his father's point inquires "What exactly do you mean, dad?" "Daniel" says his father "in karate it takes years to earn a black belt, however the second you walk into that yeshiva they practically give them out free." What is the purpose of the Gartel and why do some people wear it and others don't? Halachaboy has researched this topic and found three reasons brought down as to why the custom of some is wear a Gartel: 1, Tosfos brings down that there is a requirement to seperate your heart from your lower half when praying (separating, your animalistic lower side, from your spiritual upper half). 2. The pasuk in Amos (a lesser known but definitely important Navi) says "Prepare to meet your G-d, O Israel" (4:12) and thus we learn out one should have specific garments for prayer like a warrior has for battle. 3. The Bach and others right that one should dress when praying like he is standing before a king, or other important dignitary. Now a days the Bach's opinion is not fulfilled through a Gartel because no one wears Gartels as a normal form of dress. Tosfos's opinion isn't fulfilled either because we normally wear a belt (or elastic waistband) which suffices as a separation. However, based on the pasuk in Amos it would seem that one ideally should still wear a Gartel or at least have some other means of preparing himself for davening ( A davening jacket, hat, etc) and one should certainly not look down on those that do or do not wear a Gartel as there is much to rely on either way. However, I want to point out two quick stories of people that missed the point of this whole Halacha: Rav Herschel Schecter, Rosh Yeshiva at YU, is fond of repeating a story he heard from Rav Shimon Schwab. Rav Schwab was going to daven mincha one day and there was a businessman wearing a suit at the minyan. The man had forgotten his gartel, and proceeded to take off his tie and use it as a gartel. R' Schwab commented that what the man did was incorrect. Nowadays, a gartel is a minhag, it is not part of a person's dress. However, a tie is an integral part of a person's dress (for businessman) and for many people if they are not wearing a tie they are not fully dressed. Therefore, the man would have been better off leaving the tie on and not davening with a gartel as the gartel is stam a minhag while the tie could be min hadin. And secondly, also told over by Rav Schecter Rav Soloveichick at one pointed stopped wearing a jacket for shacharis during the week. One of the talmidim asked him why? He explained that he started wearing R' Chaim's (the Rav's grandfather's) old tefillin, and the batim were very large so he couldn't put his arm with the tefillin on them into the sleeve. So what, ask the Talmid, The Rav replied that no one would walk around in the street or to meet an important person with their jacket on one arm and hanging off the other arm and therefore he thought that it was more kavod not to wear the jacket at all. It should be noted that some shuls require those davening to wear a jacket. However, they wear any old outer jacket. This minhag seems very difficult to justify, as the idea of wearing a jacket is based of the requirement of the Bach, that one should dress like he is going to an important meeting when davening, and while people wear suit jackets in meetings, nobody would wear a windbreaker or sweatshirt. We should all try not only to do, but to understand the reason behind our actions- so we don't miss the boat. Wax on, Wax off !

Parshas Va'eschanan: Drawing Pictures of Nature and Celestial Bodies

From the realms of activities that seem permitted but actually might get you stoned, Halachaboy presents the follow query: In this weeks Parsha the Torah commands "lest ye deal corruptly, and make you a graven image, even the form of any figure, the likeness of male or female. the likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the heaven, the likeness of any thing that creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the water under the earth; and lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven, thou be drawn away and worship them, and serve them, which the LORD thy God hath allotted unto all the peoples under the whole heaven" (Devarim 4:16-19). [ I apologize for the translation, its the only one I could find on the computer] And one perek later, in the Ten Commandments, "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, even any manner of likeness, of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them; for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God" (Devarim 5: 7-8) Now let me ask you all a question- every child colors pictures of beautiful sceneraries. The glowing sun, a sprouting tree, a glistening rainbow. And as parents we ooh and ahh and praise these beautiful works of art. However, doesn't the pasuk above clearly prohibit such activity. Would we ever praise our children for eating traif, so why do we praise our children for their works of art. Knowing you, you are probably saying that the Torah only prohibits works used for Avodah Zara, however read those Pasukim again. The torah says you can't make works of art and then adds a separate prohibition of worshipping them. Thus we can deduce that even without worshipping such works, the mere creation of a work of art that resembles anything on heaven and below is forbidden. In fact, the Shulchan Aruch writes that there is a prohibition against depicting images of Avodah Zarah (even if you aren't making them or using them for such). The prohibited images include the sun, the moon and the stars! Rav Moshe Feinstein was actually asked this question when someone asked him whether young children should draw pictures of the sun in school. He said that their representations of the sun would be permissible since they are not going to be accurate. He added, however, that as children mature and develop their artistic capabilities, there could be a real problem (and so, he queries, why even get them started?). To conclude. Let the children draw, just make sure the drawings don't amount to anything good! Mural of the story (get it??)- We think we know a lot of Torah and Halacha, but we haven't even scratched the surface. So keep on studying!

Parshas Maasei: Selling Meat During the Nine Days

Dear Halachaboy: I own a Kosher meat restaurant and while my clientele is mainly frum Jews, I do have plenty of non-frum customers. May I continue to sell meat products to them during the nine days? To Senior Steak Seller: As you mentioned during the nine days it is prohibited for Jews to eat meat. However, there is certainly no prohibition to sell meat to another person, and thus it is totally fine to sell meat to non-Jews. In regards to selling meat to fellow Jews I believe your question is more of Lifnei Iver question, then a nine days one. So in order to get a better understanding of the concept of Lifnei Iver I will digress and explain some of its rules. For the sake of enjoyment I would like to answer you question with a seemingly unrelated question: Can you set up a guy and a girl who you know won't keep Taharas HaMispacha? Or perhaps you can ask can a Rabbi of community perform a wedding on a couple who he knows won't keep Taharas HaMispacha? Back to our answer. Lifnei Iver, literally translated as "in front of the blind", is a biblical prohibition against placing a stumbling block in front of someone who can not see. Our Rabbis told us this also applies to giving someone bad advice on purpose, and thus taking advantage of him. However, Lifnei Iver might also extend to facilitating someone to commit an Averah. The Gemara in Avodah Zara (6b) writes that if one passes a Nazer wine, or a Ben Noach some Aver Min HaChay he has violated the commandment of Lifnei Iver- he has facilitated someone elses sin. The Gemara, however, makes one quick clarification. One can only violate the prohibition of Lifnei Iver if the Naazer couldn't have gotten the wine himself (Tre Avrah D'Nara- you were on two seperate sides of the river), however, if the Naazer could have gotten the wine himself (Chad Avrah D'Nara- you were on the same side of the river), you just helped him that is not a violation of the Biblical Commandment of Lifnei Iver. The Rishonim due argue as to whether there is a Rabbanic prohibition of "Ma'Saya" (or facilitating) when there is no Biblical prohibition of Lifnei Iver. We generally assume that there does exist a Rabbinic prohibition of Ma'Saya. However, Rav Moshe writes that if one is helping not to facilitate his friend's crime but for his own personal benefit then the prohibition of Ma'Saya does not exist. Thus, while it is commendable to tell every Jew that comes to purchase meat that eating meat is prohibited during the nine days (with some exceptions: shabbas, siyum, etc), there is no prohibition on you if you choose to sell it to them. A. Lifnei Iver is not an issue because they can go somewhere else to buy meat. B. Ma'Saya is not an issue because you are doing it for your own profitable interest and not to facilitate his crime. In conclusion, for the same rationale one may set up a couple who won't keep all the Mitzvos and a Rav can perform a ceremony for them, provided they receive some financial compensation. (Perhaps one of the sources for paying a Shadchan).

Parshas Maatos: Loshon Hara if the Information is Public

Q: " Dear HalachaBoy, I just found out a friend of mine got arrested. Since it is being reported in the newspapers am I allowed to tell people?" A: Dear Friends in the Pound, Thank you for taking the time and writing to me, it is exciting to see people actually read what I write. In regards to your question I think the best way to answer, is to actual break your question into two separate questions. First, since the newspapers are reporting it the fact must exist that your friend did actually get arrested (newspapers only report things that they verify {or so we hope}). Thus, the first question we must deal with is the question of is it Loshon Hara to tell the truth? The Chofetz Chaim points out in his Sefer aptly called Chofetz Chaim that it is forbidden to speak disparagingly of one's friend even if the information is entirely truthful. That is the defintion of ashon Hara. If the information also contains any fabrication or falsehood that is called motzi shem ra (lit. putting out a bad name). Motzi Shem Ra is an even worse sin that Loshon Hara. Secondly, since the newspapers are reporting in it can be assumed that 3 people already know. The Gemara records a leniency that if 3 people already know the fact that you wish to convey, then your conveying it is not loshon hara. Would that apply here, and thus allowing me to tell others? With regard to the leniency stated by the Sages of the Talmud about speaking L"H to a group of 3 or more (Erchin 15b), this refers to something which is not absolutely derogatory, but rather something which could be taken one way or the other. Only for such ambiguous statements, about which one can only know what was meant if he actually heard how the information was said, does the leniency of "bifnei shlosha" (Heb. for "in front of three") apply. Many people misquote this leniency to allow any type of Loshon Hara as long as it is already public knowledge. Yet, clearly the gemara only allows you to say something that is ambiguous, and definitely not something negative. Thus it seems from this that even though the fact your friend got arrested is quoted in the newspapers, still you would not be allowed to tell other people. However, if you must retell this information at least try to construe it in an ambiguous way and leave it to the listener to interpret the facts. (i.e. "that candy bar looks good, I'm sure if Yankel was here he would get it" letting the listener try to figure out if "get" means to purchase or steal. As we have reached the Three Weeks we should all try a little harder to keep from speaking loshon hara. Unfortunately, in America everywhere you look there is loshon hara (tabloids, tv, newspapers) it has become a part of us. Let us try to work on this-- It's not easy, but any progress will surely be seen and rewarded by Hashem

Parshas Pinchas: Bris on Shabbas

What happens when a bris milah falls out on a fast day? As the HalachaTeam encourages those reading to ask questions, we will for sure answer this (and hopefully any other question thrown our way). In order to fully understand this questions the term fasts must be broken into 3 categories: 1. Yom Kippur and Tisha B'av. 2. The four minor fasts. 3. Any fast not on its set day (for example: Purim on Sunday, so Taanis Ester should be Shabbas, but can't fast on Shabbas so fast on Thursday). Further I am assuming the questioner is concerned about both the drinking of the wine at the bris (which is normally drunken by the Mohel) and the festive Seudah that follows. In regards to category 1 the Shulchan Aruch writes that the Seuda should be held at the conclusion of the fast. In other words have everyone reconvene and have a nice break-fast. In terms of the drinking of the wine, it is assumed you give it to child (under the age of chinuch) or even the baby himself to drink. Category 2 is the same as category 1 except for the fact that during the 4 minor fasts a nursing women is exempt for fasting. Thus, the Shulchan Aruch provides the option of giving the babies mother the wine to drink. The Rama rules against this custom, but for the Sefardim out there I figured I would mention it. Finally in regards to category 3. the Rema ruled that since this is not the official time of the fast, the baal bris and all of his guests may break the fast for the sake of the seudas milah. However, they are nonetheless obligated to make up for the fast on Friday. Some opinions, however, take a more stringent view and argue that when Chazal established Thursday as the altered date of the fast, Thursday is now its correct time and the taanis may not be pushed off for the sake of a milah. The seudah should then be celebrated after breaking the fast, as is usually done when a bris takes place on a fast day. At this point some of you might be tempted to ask, " What was the Rema thinking? Isn't it preferable to stay clear of dispute, and just put the seudah off until after the fast has concluded?" It is worthwhile to consider that bris milah transforms the day into a Yom Tov for the person who makes the bris. Yom Tov is a time for celebration and rejoicing, and in this light, delaying the seudah is not a simple matter. While many don't sing and dance at a Bris due to the pain felt by the child, we must all realize that the Bris is in a sense greater simcha then even a Bar Mitzva or Wedding. A young child is entering G-d's chosen nation. What greater Simcha is there? No such thing as Coincidence- but it happens to be that this weeks Parshas is Pinchas. What is the connection between Pinchas and Bris Milah? We mention his name at a Bris once and that is more than the name Moshe. Take a look.

Bishul Akum #6

The Nanny: A Great TV Show, but a Disaster in the Kitchen Some call her the maid, others the nanny, and a few even describe her as their mother. Yet, rarely do you hear non-jewish help in your house called the "Kitchen Korrupter" (I thought of that myself). She's non-jewish, she cooks her own food with no assistance from a Jew. People go crazy when the nanny feeds the kids pork, but shouldn't we be up in arms when she cooks them their regular homemade dinner? What is the leniency to allow a non-jewish maid to cook in a Jewish home? And why isn't that Bishul Akum? In general, one should not leave goyishe help at home alone, for one cannot be sure20that they won't prepare non-kosher food in the kitchen utensils. Tosofos brings the view of Rabbeinu Avrohom that the prohibition of bishul akum does not apply in the house of a Yid where intermarriage and non-kosher food are not problems. The halacha, however, follows the view of Rabbeinu Tam that Chazal did not distinguish between the domain of a Yid and the domain of a goy regarding bishul akum. Therefore what would come out of this is that if you have a maid and allow her to cook your children dinner from scratch, you might as well be serving them chicken and cheese (both are prohibitions from the rabbanan) However, some Rishonim mention that the entire prohibition of bishul akum was only enacted in instances where the goy has the free will to decide whether he would like to cook the food or not. In instances where the goy is a slave or a hired worker and does not entirely possess that free will, there is no prohibition. But this two is not accepted in normative halacha. But what about the pots? Do the pots that the nanny used to cook in become traif- and require kashering? The Rashba and the Rosh argue whether the Bishul Akum decree extends to utensils that touched hot food cooked by a non-Jew. The Rashba argues that we are not only forbidden to eat the food eaten by the non-Jew, but the utensils that touch hot food that a non-Jew cooked are also rendered not Kosher. The Shulchan Aruch cites both the view of the Rashba and the Rosh, but it presents the Rashba's strict view as the primary view. So be careful with the nanny and if a situation arises or has arose where goyishe household help cooked something in a Jewish house, a Rav should be consulted to determine if based on the situation there are any grounds for leniency.

Bishul Akum #5

As Hagacha Pratis would have I found myself this week in a Dunkin Donuts when a YU Rosh Yeshiva and Rav for the Vaad of Bergen County (Teaneck) walked in. We got to shmoozing and I asked him about the eggs and cheese. He replied that while the Vaad does not give the Hechser to the Dunkin Donuts in Teaneck he thought it was for sure permissible to eat the egg and cheese. His logic was based off the Yerusalmi we mentioned last week that having a non-jew steam food is not a violation of Bishul Akum. He felt the only explantion for this is that Bishul Akum only applies to heat (fire) cooking and not other conventional cooking methods. But what about coffee? I am told by my consultants that Dunkin Donuts coffee is far superior to Starbucks-- and the people that drink Starbucks coffee are doing it more for status than taste. Coffee is made by heating water with an electric element (which for halachic purposes is a fire). So shouldn't coffee be Bishul Akum? The answer to this is that cooked water does not qualify for bishul akum. Although roasted coffee beans cannot be used without brewing, and coffee is a prestigious beverage which is served at weddings (conditions that would create a bishul akum). Nevertheless, since the water is considered the main component of the beverage and the coffee is considered a flavoring, freshly brewed coffee would not be subject to the restriction of bishul akum. As we mentioned in prior weeks any food item that could be eaten raw/uncooked there is no violation for a non-jew to cook it. Thus, since water is something drinkable uncooked and the coffee is just flavoring the water there is no violation to drink coffee brewed by a non-jew. Enjoy the Coffee.

Bishul Akum #4

What's the only thing better than eggs and cheese on a bagel? Processed eggs and cheese on a bagel. Which brings me to this week's discussion. Last week we mentioned that if a Jew assists in the cooking process (usually through igniting the pilot light) the food cooked is viewed as Bishul Yisroel and not a violation of Bishul Akum. But what about food cooked in a microwave? Each time you turn on the microwave it is a new cooking and thus it would seem you would need a Jew to push the actual button. You might be asking: microwaves don't cook they reheat, but in theory (or in my favorite food: Dunkin Donuts Egg and Cheese---YUMMMM!!!!) how is the non-jew allowed to push the button? This question bothered me for a while. If you haven't realized I love egg and cheese and the possibility of not being able to get one from Dunkin Donuts really bothered me. I finally, got the courage and asked a rav of the Vaad of Queens and he told me that currently no restaurants in Queens cook by means of a microwave, but it did come up years ago and they ruled that in fact a Jew must push the button. However, if you ever ordered an egg and cheese (my favorite) in the Dunkin Donuts in the Five Town the non-jew pushes the button. So what is the deal? The basis for this argument is that the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch rule that smoked foods (lox) are not included within the Bishul Akum restriction. The Rama (ibid.) writes that only foods cooked by using fire are included in this prohibition. Approximately one hundred years ago, rabbinical authorities began to debate whether steamed foods (veggies) are included within the Bishul Akum prohibition. Proponents of the lenient view argued that steaming is analogous to smoking and not cooking, since the food is not directly cooked through means of a fire. Another argument for leniency was that since the steaming of foods was first introduced many centuries after Chazal forbade Bishul Akum, steaming was not a form of cooking that was included in the original decree. Rav Ovadia Yosef rules leniently that steaming is not included within the parameters of the Bishul Akum decree. Today, rabbinical authorities debate whether cooking by means of a microwave oven is included in the prohibition of Bishul Akum. The arguments for leniency are that when one cooks with a microwave he is not cooking by fire and that microwave technology was not available at the time when Chazal promulgated the Bishul Akum decree and thus was not included in the prohibition. Those that are stringent base there stringency on the fact that the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch only ruled smoking isn't Bishul Akum because it was not common then. However, nowadays microwave cooking is considered a normal way of cooking, and thus perhaps prohibited. In addition, the cooked food is almost identical in taste to food cooked over a fire, and therefore a microwave would be included in Chazal's enactment of bishul akum. Although there are those who rule stringently we have what to rely on. At the end of the day we can certainly assume that eggs and cheese is not on the President's menu anytime soon.

Bishul Akum #3

Last week we spoke about the two exceptions to the aveirah of Bishul Akum (food that is readily edible without cooking and food not fit to be served on a kings table). This week I would like to discuss what happens if those exceptions do not exist. As we mentioned last week most kosher restaurants employ non-Jewish chefs and the food cooked in the kitchen does not fall into those exceptions. So how is that food kosher? Isn't that a perfect example of Bishul Akum? There is in fact a machlokes between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rama as to whether it is enough for a Jew to just participate in the cooking process (even if the food item is not exclusively cooked by a Jew) to be considered Bishul Yisroel and not Bishul Akum. The Shulchan Aruch ruled the Jew must place the food item on the fire for it to be considered Bishul Yisroel (and thus is the stringent opinion of many Sefardim). However the Rama ruled leniently and allowed the Jew to merely add kindling to the fire to be considered the cooked item Bishul Yisroel. The Star-K paskened that there a two ways for a Jew to participate in the cooking process: a) The food is placed in a cold stove or cooking apparatus and then the Yehudi lights the fire. b) The fire or pilot light in an empty oven is first lit by the Yehudi and remains lit continuously. After being lit the food can be placed inside by anyone. The first method is the optimal one. I am sure many people have heard of this leniency using the pilot light, but there are some questions we can ask on this. The following questions and answered were compiled by Star-K: 1. If a pilot light is burning continuously, how long can it remain lit without Yehudi intervention and still be considered bishul Yisroel? If the pilot is directly heating the stove or the pot, as the old style pilot lights of a gas oven, the light can burn indefinitely and still retain bishul Yisroel status. If the pilot light indirectly lights the burner but does not add heat to the food, as the old style central pilot light of a gas cook top, then a halachic authority needs to be consulted to determine if the burner needs to be lit each time (even the first time) by a Yehudi even though the pilot light burns continuously.2. Can bishul Yisroel be achieved by setting a timer that will ignite the oven at set intervals? No. Since the Yehudi does not perform direct lighting of the oven it would not qualify for bishul Yisroel. In commercial settings (e.g. hotels, hospitals or factories) where large boilers provide the steam for the cooking equipment, bishul Yisroel requirements would be fulfilled if the Yehudi flips a switch or presses a button that directly ignites a boiler. 3. If an oven that was lit by a Yehudi was subsequently turned off, but remained warm until being relit by an akum, would the bishul Yisroel status of this oven be nullified? As long as the oven remains warm the bishul Yisroel status remains intact. Some Rebbeim a few years back wanted to take this leniency one step further and proposed that instead of lighting a pilot light, why not have the Masgiach, or another Jew, install the light bulb in the oven. The light bulb will provide heat to the cooked food, and will stay on longer than the pilot avoided (and thus avoiding the fear the pilot light will go out and the non-Jew will inadvertently relight it). However the OU points out that various poskim have argued against the light bulb system. The main contention with the "light bulb" is that when a Jew adds a wood chip to a fire, it is rendered aish yisrael because the Jew is instrumental in preparing and intensifying the fire. In contrast, a light bulb remains separate and distinct from the fire, and the Jew is not a contributor to the primary source of heat. The OU does not subscribe to the light bulb system, though a number of other kosher organizations do utilize the light bulb hetter. It is worth noting that even those kosher organizations that use this leniency require the bulb to be producing substantial heat that in theory could be equated to the wood chip on fire. However, just to have a light bulb that does not provide heat into the cooking chamber would not suffice. Have a good Kosher shabbas.

Bishul Akum #2

Last week we began our discussion on Bishul Akum. To review: the Rabbi's forbade eating any food that was cooked by a non-jew. This week we will discuss a few of the exceptions to the rule and in the following weeks discuss some important issues and potential violations that result from this rule. Again before the question of Bisul Akum is even asked we must be certain and know that the food and all preparation utensils are kosher before eating. When it comes to Bishul Akum there are two exceptions already mentioned in the Gemara. The Gemara in Avodah Zara writes that any food that can be eaten raw, when cooked by a non-jew is not forbidden. Since one can eat this food prior to cooking the Rabbis were not worried one would form a bond with the non-jewish chef. Some examples that of food eaten that use this exception are apple sauce, fruit cocktails, and canned vegetables. The second leniency mentioned in the Gemara is termed: " Aino Roy L'Shulchan Melachim"- literally translated as not fit for the table of kings. This exception is similar to the exception mentioned above in that the Rabbis were not afraid of a bond being created between a jew and his non-jewish chef when the chef was cooking simple, non-Chasuv food. Some examples of this leniency are potato chips, candy, and bagels. However we must ask the following question: since we do not have kings anymore, how do we establish what is "fit for their table" and what isn't? The Star-K generally assumes that whatever would be served at the White House State Dinner would be a problem of Bishul Akum. For example, when dealing with the question of potato chips Rav Moshe Heinemann, Chief Mashgiach of the Star K, was in contact with the head chef of the White House Dinner who when asked about serving potato chips replied "We would serve whatever the guest wants, however, we never served potato chips." That being said, there are many food items that do not fall into these two exceptions and in the coming weeks we will explore what if any leniency can we use to allow non-jews to cook such food. In an informal survey I found that a majority of kosher restaurants employ non-jewish chefs- shouldn't this be a problem of Bishul Akum? Stayed tuned next week. Same HalachaTime, Same HalachaChannel.

Bishul Akum #1

There are two impetuses (impeti) that led me to research and write up the following topic. First, the last few weeks we spoke about the issue of chodosh/yoshon and I figured it was appropriate to continue that discussion with another edible issue. Second, one of my coworkers this week was badgering me (unclear why this word makes sense, why not cougaring, or elephanting- maybe parshaman will research this one) about Kosher food- especially Starbucks coffee- which got me to thinking......... Along with the many revolutionary ideas and changes that took place in the 20th century, there is one change that forever changed how Jews eat. That change was the development of Kashrus organizations. Not to long ago, every Jew knew all the halachos of what's kosher and what wasn't and he would go to the store and buy whatever it was that was kosher. However, with the 20th century came huge advances in food preparations. No longer was a piece a meat just a piece a meat, but now that meat had additives, preservatives, fillers, etc. Thus with the complexity of the food industry and various secret recipes no longer was one able to rely on his own Kup (brain) to determine what was kosher and what wasn't. This problem led to the formation of Kashrus organizations: various Rabbis who thoroughly researched each food item to determine precisely what the ingredient are, how it is made, packaged, shipped, etc. Thus, nowadays for one to read the ingredients list on the back of any food item and assume it is kosher is clearly dubious. For how do you know what all those terms mean? Further even if you knew all of the ingredient were kosher- you couldn't be certain the item was kosher- for perhaps they cooked something traif in the same vat right before. Now realize, halachic requirement and FDA requirements are very different. I don't claim to be an expert in either- but I would assume that according the FDA as long as a pot is thoroughly cleaned you can reuse it for another food item. However, halacha might assume that the taste of the first (non-kosher item) goes into the walls and emerges when being cooked with the second, seemingly kosher, item. However, if one were able to ascertain that the food is clearly made of only kosher ingredients and was positive nothing non-kosher got into the food in the storing, cooking, packing, shipping process then there still is another hurdle one must leap before eating the item: Bishul Akum. The Rabbis (as recorded in Gemara Avodah Zara) decreed that one may not eat any food that was cooked exclusively by a non-jew. Rashi gives to reasons for this either because it would lead to intermarriage, or perhaps if the jew gets into the habit of eating food cooked by a non-jew one day the non-jew (whether by accident or on purpose) will come to feed the jew some non-kosher food. Tosfos provides a Nafka Mina (practical difference) between these two schools of reasoning: what if the non-jew cooked the food in a Jews home using only ingredients from the Jews cupboard (couldn't have said pantry, or cabinet, but cupboard is soo Old School)? According to the reasoning of Intermarriage- the prohibition would still apply (you are developing a bond with the non-jew), however if the reasoning is we are worried the non-jew will serve you traif- here there is nothing to worry about. In the coming weeks we will hopefully discuss when this issur applies, to what food items does it apply to and are there any leniency's. In the meantime if you have any questions please feel free to email thehalachaboy@gmail.com or any responsible Rav.

Chodosh and Yoshon #2

Last week we began our discussion regarding the biblical requirement of Yoshon- only eating from grains that were rooted before the 16th of Nisan. Since, no one argues that this requirement exists- why have so few of us heard of it and why have so many us not kept it? There is great discussion by the rishonim and poskim in certain details of the mitzva that when combined together have led many including the Rama (the chief Ashkenazic Posek) to rule that it doesn't apply anymore. First off maybe this requirement is only if the grain is in Israel. We know that certain mitzvos, shmitta for example, only apply in Israel, perhaps some argue that Yoshon also only applies in Israel. This contention has one serious flaw though, the pasuk that mentions the requirement of Yoshon states that this rule applies "Bchol Moshvosechem" in all your cities. Why would the torah go out of its way to mention that this requirement applies in your all your cities, if not to include cities outside of Israel? Some answer, however, that this requirement merely extends the prohibition to the surrounding lands of Israel (Jordan, Syria, etc) and not to countries outside there. Second, maybe the requirement is only if the crop was grow by a Jew, like Shmittah again. Third, since most of our baked goods aren't home made and it is very difficult to verify that the producer (General Mills) is using yoshon, we can assume it is a Safek (doubt) whether the producer uses Yoshon or not. It should however be pointed out, as it was brought to my attention, that one should not rely on the assumption that "since it takes a while from the crop to be harvest till it gets to my table- it must be yoshon" for apparently it can take less than 3 months from the grain to go from ground to cereal bowl. Due to these doubts and arguments, the Rama rules that one can be lenient and rely on the principle of Safek Safeka- when you have two separate doubts in halacha you have the right to rule lenient. Many explain that the logic behind this is based off a Rov- Majority. Since we have two doubts the potential for doing wrong is only 25%. Thus there is a 75% of this item being ok. (I could explain this further but who wants a math lesson on shabbas). Here the two leniencies are 1. Maybe the requirement doesn't apply outside of Israel and 2. Maybe the requirement is only by produce of a Jew. In Israel, however, since these doubts do not exist- everyone agrees one must eat exclusively Yoshon- and this is verified by the many reliable Hechserim there.